L. T. LIBRARY

The ARYAN PATH

Vol. XXXII JULY 1961 No. 7

CONTENTS

FETTERS OF DESTINY (EDITORIAL) 291

THE MANY-COLOURED COAT (POEM)—*By Odette Tchernine* 294

THE WAY IN ISLAM—I—*By A. J. Arberry* 295

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF HALI—*By Fatima Shuja'at* 302

THE ANALOGY OF THE IMAGE—*By G. Srinivasan* 308

THE ALBERT SCHWEITZER COLLEGE—*By Florence E. Pettit* 313

FILM (POEM)—*By Herbert Bluen* 316

NEW BOOKS AND OLD—

"THE FIRST FIVE LIVES OF ANNIE BESANT"—*By C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar* 317

"HINDU AND MUSLIM MYSTICISM"—*By S. Vahiduddin* 318

REVIEWS—*By Philip Leon, E. W. Martin, Kenneth Walker, A. K. Jiandani, M. Kaye, K. Krishnamoorthy, D. Gurumurti, A. A. A. Fyzee, W. Montgomery Watt, E. W., M. Yamunacharya, Sylva Norman, F. Seymour Smith, Herbert Bluen, K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar and C. B.* 320

PAGAN GONE WEST—*By Baldoon Dhingra* 330

ENDS AND SAYINGS 334

"THEOSOPHY HALL," NEW MARINE LINES — BOMBAY, INDIA

THE ARYAN PATH

ORGAN OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF WORLD CULTURE

Editor: SOPHIA WADIA

Assistant Editor: RAMESHCHANDRA SIRKAR

ADDRESSES

Editorial Office:	"THEOSOPHY HALL" 40, New Marine Lines Bombay 1
Managerial Office:	No. 1/1, Bugle Rock Road Basavangudi Bangalore 4
London Office:	62, Queen's Gardens London, W. 2
Indian Institute of World Culture	No. 6, Shri B. P. Wadia Road Basavangudi Bangalore 4

* * * * *

CONTRIBUTIONS—The Editor is responsible for unsigned articles only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given.

SUBSCRIPTIONS—THE ARYAN PATH is published monthly. No subscriptions are accepted for less than twelve months, but subscriptions may begin with any desired number. All orders should be accompanied by the necessary remittance to the Manager, THE ARYAN PATH, 1/1, Bugle Rock Road, Bangalore 4, or to our London Office at 62, Queen's Gardens, London, W. 2.

PRICES:

India—Single copy 75 *naye paise*; per annum Rs. 6.00

Europe—Single copy 1*s*. 6*d*; per annum 12*s*. or equivalent.

Americas—Single copy 35 cents; per annum $3.00

All post free

Available in the U.S.A. from
Eastern News Distributors
255 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N.Y.

Back numbers are available on special application

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXXII JULY 1961 No. 7

FETTERS OF DESTINY

[WE reprint the following editorial from THE ARYAN PATH, April 1934. —ED.]

THE SEEDS OF DESTINY develop from within without, in the soil of our civilization. This implies country, race, family. The Soul with its seeds is not born into a particular family, country or race by accident or by chance. It is *attracted* to its own circumstances and surroundings. What we call obstacles arising from our circumstances are but the necessary resistances offered by the soil to the seeds of destiny. This teaching that our circumstances, our bodily and other limitations, are our own self-made destiny, has been wrongly applied and large numbers of people, in the name of contentment and resignation, sit down with folded arms and say: "Karma, Kismet, Fate!" There is truth in the charge levelled against India, that its present fallen condition is largely due to the misunderstanding and the misapplication of this doctrine of Karma or destiny. Such an attitude is wrong because it overlooks the aspect of present exertion, self-choice and use of free will. And that brings us to the very important practical teaching — the central teaching of our subject: DESTINY MANIFESTS ITSELF IN TERMS OF EXERTION.

In our destiny we have good and bad aspects, strong and weak forces. These aspects and forces precipitate themselves in our lives through our present actions. It is possible to starve out the evil forces of destiny by abstaining from evil actions in the present. It is also possible to bring out the beneficent forces and aspects by the performance of righteous actions. Exertion and destiny are like positive and negative electricity; exertion is positive, destiny is negative. At any given moment, in any particular situation, the descent of fate depends on what we choose to do now, and how we exert ourselves to fulfil that

choice. Without present action past destiny cannot show itself. Hour by hour, in act after act, we make a canal for the good waters of destiny to flow into. Similarly, hour by hour, we can build a dam to prevent the dirty waters of destiny from drowning us. This philosophical principle is highly practical and on its understanding and correct application depends the answer to our question — How can a man defeat his destiny?

All men and women instinctively recognize that they must do righteous deeds — unselfish, and kindly and just; and yet they are not able to act thus. Selfishness, egotism, greed overpower us. The sins of omission and commission are numerous as well as varied. We saw that our destiny has two aspects, good and evil, and has three constituents, mind, character and body. Our present exertion must be in connection with these three things and also must have a dual aspect. We must commit good acts; we must omit evil ones; thus we make room for the good aspect of destiny to manifest, and prevent the expression of the evil aspect. But both these processes of commission and omission must be deliberate. We must deliberately eschew wrong; equally deliberately must we do right. And these two deliberate actions must be in reference to the three seeds of mind, character and body.

This brings us to the exercise to be daily done; not spasmodically but regularly, with the purpose ever kept in view, the defeat of evil destiny. Three fetters have to be broken; three ornaments have to be secured. The fetters of mind, character and body are acts to be omitted; the ornaments are acts to be committed. The fetters are for the thieves of Nature, the ornaments for her Kings. Many are the thieves of Nature; people like ourselves are neither thieves nor Kings; we fear the robber and seek the royal company. What are these fetters and ornaments?

The fetter of the mind is its disposition to continue as a prisoner of Kama — desires and passions. Our cravings and ambitions imprison our minds, nay more, exploit them. The ambition of the man of business imprisons and exploits his mind; our fears and hopes, our loves and hates, act as heavy chains on our mind, and disable its returning to the freedom of its own estate. The soul must instil into the mind courage to fight and defeat the enemy of passions and desires; for that purpose the mind must be made to recognize its abject slavery to desires and passions. We must present the mind with the shining jewels of divine ideas — noble, liberal and cosmic. Of these shining jewels of high thoughts a crown must be made, for our mind must be the crown of the Soul who is the King. Hence daily study, constant company of

high thoughts and liberal ideas, association with holy and learned men, are necessary.

The fetter of character is the sense of possession inherent in most people. Not only the wicked, are greedy and competitive; the good also are charged with that feeling of greed. The ornament of character is philanthropy. Fight and defeat your sense of possession by cultivating philanthropy. But do not misunderstand; it is not the giver of money only who is a philanthropist, often he is not! The real philanthropist begins with thoughtfulness and good will in small affairs. Personal attention to the woes and difficulties of others, personal help rendered, personal advice given — in such seemingly small acts of good will the true philanthropist is born. To write a cheque from our surplus funds is easy enough; to think and feel for our neighbour is very difficult. Philanthropy is the ornament of character. If the mind is the crown of the Soul, philanthropy is the sceptre. The authority of the King is never in the rod of punishment, but in the wand of philanthropy. Without philanthropy we cannot be just, for then justice is robbed of mercy.

The fetter of the body is in its personal separative aspect, with which we identify ourselves. People say, "I am a man," "I am a woman" — we are not; we are Souls, human Souls; or "I am Hindu or Parsi, I am Indian or European," and so on — this it is that makes the fetter of the body, a hard iron chain very difficult to break. That is taking a personal view of the body. How shall we defeat the destiny of the body? By cleansing it of all its personal separative tendencies; by clothing it in the royal robe of humanism. Our body is first and foremost a *human* body, not an animal rupa. To be human we must be humane. To don the robe of humanism, that is the third thing we must do.

And now we have answered the question — How can man defeat his own destiny? By fulfilling it.

Make of your body a human body; have philanthropy and good will as the basis of your character; fill your mind with great ideas which have ever moved men and masses of men to righteousness. Thus we defeat the evil destiny and fulfil our dharma — to be human, to be man.

Our heritage is royalty. Forgetting that, we have become exiles from our spiritual kingdom, we have become untouchables, eating the carrion of pride, living in the filth of selfishness, greed and fear. But, untouchables as we are, if we take courage, we see that there are the Royal Fathers of the Race, the Compassionate Sages who encourage us,

inspire us, to walk out of our present degradation into the joy of knowledge, of altruism, of brotherhood. So let us all endeavour to defeat our destiny by fulfilling it. Let us never forget that in the midnight darkness of failure there is the herald of the dawn of success. Feel the power of Royalty within your heart and triumph will be yours.

THE MANY-COLOURED COAT

I wear an ever-weaving coat
Of many-coloured dye,
The seams renew themselves with light
When threads unravelled lie.
The colours fox those casual ones
Who think, if think they do,
That no one sound can wear a coat
As varied as I do.
Yet in the open pockets of
My different-coloured coat
Lie separate kindred wonders
Seen and thought, ashore, afloat
From revelations of infinite
Mind that wrought the plan
Of sacrifice and mystery
Interpreted by man
Some thousand, thousand years before
The clear two-thousand span
Which brought to earth the nearest
Revelation made to man.

And so I listen to the words
Of minds of varied hue,
The Christ-love, the convivial, and
The bodhisattva too,
For the variegated pebble, thought,
Reflects in every race
A many-coloured mantle from
The Maker's time and space.

—Odette Tchernine

THE "WAY" IN ISLAM

[**Dr. A. J. Arberry, M.A., Litt.D., F.B.A.,** is Sir Thomas Adams Professor of Arabic at the University of Cambridge and a distinguished authority on Persian and Arabic literature and the whole subject of Near and Middle Eastern culture generally. He is the author of a large number of books on Persian and Arabic literature, religion and culture, the latest being *Classical Persian Literature* (1958) and *Oriental Essays* (1960).

To THE ARYAN PATH he is an old and esteemed friend, and with this richly substantiated account of the image of the "Way" in Islam he adds to a long list of scholarly contributions.

The image of the "Way" is a central one in many mystical traditions. The Teacher has always explained to the disciple: "Without moving, O holder of the bow, is the travelling in this road."—ED.]

I

"MYSTICS of every race and creed," writes Professor R. A. Nicholson, "have described the progress of the spiritual life as a journey or a pilgrimage." This statement is particularly true of Islam and that for very good reasons. Islam, of course, had its origin among a nomad people, to whom life was in the nature of things one long journey. The poets of ancient Arabia delighted to describe their difficult travels through the inhospitable desert; they took as their point of departure some temporary halt at a deserted encampment, which reminded them that others had passed that way before them, friends in whose society they had once taken joy, and who were perhaps taken from them for ever. Centuries later we find the same theme used by a Sufi mystic in the opening sequence of his poem of rapture as he calls to mind the lost delight of union with the Divine Beloved; so Ibn-al Fārid of Cairo (d. 1235) declares (as R. A. Nicholson renders him):—

> Where lote trees o'er the valley cast their shade
> The frenzied lover strayed.
> Alone with thoughts confusing
> Which love put in his brain,
> He lost and in his losing
> Found the way again.

But I go ahead of my programme; we must begin at the beginning. In the first Sura of the *Koran* the Muslim finds that God has put into his mouth a prayer for guidance:—

> Praise belongs to God, the Lord of all Being,
> the All-merciful, the All-compassionate,

the Master of the Day of Doom.
Thee only we serve; to Thee alone we pray for succour.
Guide us in the straight path,
the path of those whom Thou hast blessed,
not of those against whom Thou art wrathful,
nor of those who are astray.

The word used here is *sirāt,* which the Arabs took over from the Latin *stratum.* The "straight path" became synonymous for the godly life in Islam; it had no particularly mystical significance.

There is a second word for "way" in the *Koran*: *sabīl* or, more specifically, *sabīl Allāh.*

Go forth, light and heavy! Struggle in God's way
with your possessions and your selves; that is better
for you, did you know.

So in Sura 9:41 the believers are urged to fight the good fight; but for the immediate audience it was a summons to a literal battle, a Holy War against the unbelievers. The picture conjured up was of warriors riding out at dawn to engage the forces of God's enemies; the desert tract was the path along which they would journey, the goal a dusty battlefield. And already in the *Koran* the phrase *fī sabīl Allāh* came to be understood metaphorically "for the sake of God." "And expend in the way of God" — in Sura 2:191 the faithful are commanded in these words to be charitable in the cause of religion. This again, then, was not the "way" of the Mohammadan mystic.

When the Sufis looked for a word to describe their own peculiar "way," they chose a third term which occurs very rarely in the *Koran*: *tarīqa.* In Sura 20:104 the righteous are described as "the justest of them in the way." In Sura 72:16 the wish is expressed: "Would they but go straight on the way." It is interesting to observe that etymologically *tarīqa* is connected with *miṭraqa,* "hammer"; the path along which the Muslim mystic made his way had been hammered true and straight by many feet.

But that is enough of philology; it has been established that every Muslim is on a journey. There was one particular journey which all hoped to make before the earthly life was over — the journey to Mecca. The Pilgrimage stands with prayer, fasting and almsgiving among the very Pillars of Islam. The ordinary pilgrim sets out from his native place upon the road leading to Kaaba; each day's progress ended at a temporary halt, a *manzil,* where he found food and refreshment before

proceeding on the next stage. Similarly, the spiritual pilgrim on his journey passed by many stages, of which more hereafter. The ordinary pilgrim, if he was wise, would join a caravan heading for Mecca, or at all events going in that direction, and the caravan set out under the direction of an experienced leader who had often been that way before; the spiritual pilgrim had equal need of a trusty guide. "He must be a man of rectitude who has traversed all the hills and dales of the Path" — that is the prescription of Hujwīrī, eleventh-century author of the oldest Persian manual of Sufism. In Arabic such a guide was called *shaikh,* in Persian *pīr* — both words signify an old man, old in godly wisdom if not in years. The pīr-i-Mughān of Hāfiz, his "Magian elder," in the Bacchic symbolism of which, like a true Persian, he was so fond, was precisely such a man:—

Within love's caravanserai
What brief security have I?
When momently the bell doth cry,
"Bind on your loads: the hour is nigh!"

Let wine upon the prayer-mat flow,
And if the taverner bids so,
Whose wont is on this road to go
Its ways and manners well doth know.

It was the same metaphor of the journey which al-Anṣārī of Herat (d. 1088) had in mind when he wrote his brief manual of the spiritual life at the request of certain *faqīrs* of his native city; he therefore entitled it *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* (The Travellers' Stages). He began by quoting the saying of Abū Bakr al-Kattānī (d. 939): "Between God and His servant are a thousand stations of light and darkness." The word translated as "station" is *maqām,* which came to acquire a special technical meaning in Sufi writings. The tenth-century author Abū Nasr al-Sarrāj looks into the *Koran* to find its primitive connotation, and is able to cite two contexts. In Sura 14:17 God is addressing His ancient Messengers:—

Then did their Lord reveal unto them:
"We will surely destroy the evildoers,
And We will surely make you to dwell
In the land after them — that, for him
Who fears My station and fears My threat."

Commentators explain "My station" as meaning man's standing before God on the Day of Judgment. The other Koranic passage quoted

by al-Sarrāj is Sura 37:164, which is similarly glossed: "None of us is there, but has known a station."

This is as may be: personally I am inclined to see another reference in the use of this term. In Sura 2:118-9 God is recalling the institution of the Pilgrimage:—

> And when We appointed the House to be
> a place of visitation for the people,
> and a sanctuary,

and:—

> Take to yourselves Abraham's station
> for a place of prayer.

The Maqām Ibrāhīm as described by A. J. Wensinck is "a little building, a kind of pagoda" standing between the arch opposite the north-west wall of the Kaaba and the Kaaba itself. "In it is kept a stone, on which Ibrāhīm is said to have stood at the building of the Ka'ba." On the outer pavement of the Holy Shrine are three other small buildings, also called *maqāms,* named after three of the four orthodox schools of Muslim jurisprudence, where pilgrims stand to perform the ritual prayer before proceeding to kiss the Black Stone. Is it not feasible that these *maqāms* and the purpose they serve suggested it to the Sufis to call their "stations" on the way to God by the same term? This conjecture is given further plausibility when we bear in mind that, according to Sufi theory, the "stations" can be acquired and mastered by one's own efforts, as distinct from the "states" (*aḥwāl,* sing *ḥāl*) which are (in R. A. Nicholson's words) "spiritual feelings and dispositions over which a man has no control."

Abū Bakr al-Kattānī, as we have seen, reckoned that there were "a thousand stations of light and darkness" between God and His servant. Not all Sufis would agree with him; the textbooks vary in their enumeration and definitions, but none approaches anything like this total. In my little manual *Sufism* I have given the list established by al-Qushairī (d. 1079); it comes to something like forty, as compared with the more modest seven of al-Sarrāj. The catalogue of the latter runs thus: repentance, abstinence, renunciation, poverty, patience, trust in God and satisfaction. Hujwīrī and al-Qushairī agreed that the first station was repentance, which in spiritual terms would be equivalent to the *iḥrām* of the ordinary pilgrim, his putting on the white robe and entering into the state of consecration and ritual purity; it is a sign of merit to perform this act at the very beginning of the journey to Mecca,

though most pilgrims postpone it until they actually approach the sacred territory of the precincts. In al-Anṣārī's scheme, however, repentance is the second of the stations.

Since the *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* has not been used in any previous account of the Sufi Way, I propose now to devote some time to analyzing this important and influential text, whose author, for all the formalism he displays in it, was undoubtedly himself a sincere and practising mystic. I would remind you that he was the author also of a beautiful Persian book of litanies, the *Munājāt,* in which he recorded his personal meditations.

> O Generous, Who bounty givest!
> O Wise, Who sins forgivest!
> O Eternal, Who to our senses comest not near!
> O One, Who art in essence and quality without peer!
> O Powerful, Who of Godhead worthy art!
> O Creator, Who showest the way to every erring heart!
> To my soul give Thou of Thy own spotlessness,
> and to my eyes of Thy own luminousness;
> And unto us, of Thy bounty and goodness, whatever may be best
> make Thou that Thy bequest!

For al-Anṣārī the beginning of the Way was an awakening, and the call came from God.

"Say: 'I give you but one admonition, that you stand unto God. . . .'" So God spake in the *Koran* 34:45. The "standing with God" was an "awakening out of the slumber of heedlessness," this being "the first enlightenment of the servant's heart." It was the beginning of the beginning, accomplished altogether in ten stages: awakening, repentance, self-examination, conversion, meditation, recollection, holding fast (to God), fleeing (from all else but God), self-discipline and attentive listening (to God's voice).

Having completed his preliminary training, the disciple finds himself confronted by ten gates through which he must successively pass. The first is grief — over past shortcomings and wasted opportunities, over preoccupation with mundane cares that separated the soul from God. The elect, however, do not grieve; as the *Koran* 35:31 tells us:—

> And they shall say, "Praise belongs to God who has put away all sorrow from us. Surely our Lord is All-forgiving, All-thankful."

After grief comes fear — fear of the Wrath to Come and, in the higher degree, fear of the Majesty of God. This is followed by anxiety

over the soul's progress, a safeguard against spiritual pride, which leads naturally into humility:—

> Is it not time that the hearts of those
> Who believe should be humbled to the
> Remembrance of God and the Truth which
> He has sent down . . . ?

So spake God in the *Koran* 57:15. The humble worshipper will be submissive before God, and will acquire a supreme indifference to the judgment of men, whether they praise or blame him. Next in the second phase of development is enunciation, then abstinence, then devotion as required by the *Koran* 73:8: "And remember the Name of thy Lord, and devote thyself unto Him very devoutly."

The servant thus cuts himself off completely from mundane pleasures and ambitions. He puts away fear, and is ready to place all his hope in God. The *Koran* 33:21 declares: "You have had a good example in God's Messenger for whosoever hopes for God and the Last Day. . . ."

Hope engenders yearning, the last gate through which the devotee must persevere in his journey.

His further progress depends now upon practical godliness, which falls into the parts: observance, watchfulness, reverence, sincerity, integrity, rectitude, trust, self-committal and absolute confidence. His relations with God having thus been put on a firm foundation, he is able to perfect his character-training; he passes through the stations of patience, satisfaction, gratitude, shame, truthfulness, unselfishness, godly-disposition, lowliness, chivalrousness and relaxation. The last two of these ten characteristics are of particular value in putting the spiritual traveller right in his dealings with his fellow men; he has acquired a serene cheerfulness which expresses itself in a broad benevolent charity towards all God's creatures, so that he is secure against any fears of anxieties from that quarter which might intervene between him and his Creator.

He resumes his journey free to devote himself to the ultimate object of his high adventure. Ten more stations bring him to the completion of the first half of the Way: firm purpose, true resolve, unqualified desire, godly moderation, sure certainty, intimacy, remembrance, poverty, a consequent spiritual wealth and the ineffable privilege of being desired by God. The transformation from being a seeker to being one who is sought is well illustrated by some verses of the Abū' Abd Allāh al-Baraqī which are quoted in al-Kalābādhī's *Doctrine of the Sufis*:—

> The seeker's heart is based in purity,

And passion leads his steps in every glen;
Along whatever vale his course may be,
His only refuge is the Lord of men.

He paid with purity, and purely paid,
And pureness to his heart a lantern brought.
His seeking was upon the Seeker stayed:
Thrice-blessed is the Seeker who is sought!

Having sought God with utter and complete devotion, the pilgrim can apply to himself the wonderful words which God addressed to Moses when He had proved him and found him faithful (the *Koran* 20:43): "I have chosen thee for My service."

In al-Anṣārī's map of the heavenward road, the next reach traverses ten valleys, each having its own name and configuration. Another more famous account of the spiritual journey, 'Aṭṭār's *Bird Parliament,* was to tell of seven valleys — as Edward FitzGerald put it:—

And first the vale of search an endless Maze,
Branching into innumerable Ways
All courting Entrance: but one right: and this
Beset with Pitfall, Gulf, and Precipice,
Where Dust is Embers, Air a fiery Sleet,
Through which with blinded Eyes and bleeding Feet
The Pilgrim stumbles. . . .

The prosaic catalogue of al-Anṣārī records no such terrors: his valleys are called goodness, knowledge, wisdom, vision, intuition, reverence, inspiration, calm, tranquillity and holy aspiration.

A. J. Arberry

(To be concluded)

Which wilt thou choose, O thou of dauntless heart? The Samtan of "Eye Doctrine," fourfold Dhyana, or thread thy way through Paramitas, six in number, noble gates of virtue leading to Bodhi and to Prajna, seventh step of Wisdom?

The rugged Path of fourfold Dhyana winds on uphill. Thrice great is he who climbs the lofty top.

The Paramita heights are crossed by a still steeper path.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF HALI

[Sayyid Altaf Husain Panipati, poetically styled Hali, was a pupil of the famous Ghalib. Influenced greatly by Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, who started the great movement of reform and liberalism in India, Hali attempted through his poetry to make the Muslims of his time conscious of their true social and cultural heritage.

Dr. Fatima Shuja'at, who has obtained a diploma in Social Welfare from Stockholm and is now a lecturer in Sociology at the Osmania University, Hyderabad, writes in this article of Hali's concern with the many social problems of his day and his zeal as a social reformer.—Ed.]

Before we go into the details of Hali's social thought we shall examine briefly the conditions prevalent in the period of his philosophical development. As Professor Ellwood says:—

> Social thinking arises when the institutions and customs of the past no longer work well, perhaps break down, and have to be replaced by new adjustments, new values, which result in new customs and institutions.

The great historical upheaval of 1857, commonly known as the "Mutiny," but in reality the first struggle for independence from alien domination, considerably affected social thinking in India. When the revolt ended in disaster the remnants of the Moghul empire vanished and the Muslims lost whatever little power they had possessed. Conditions among them degenerated and they found themselves unable to cope with the new social currents. They could not acquire Western education, for the Muslim theologians of the day held English schools in contempt and branded them as "*Mujhalas*" (places of ignorance). At this moment a few Muslims came forward with a resolute mind and heart to adjust as best as they could their life to the new conditions. Among them Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan's name deserves priority. These enlightened few grieved deeply over the decadence of the Muslim society, the ruin of their wealthy empire and the loss of their political power. They realized that it was absolutely essential for the Muslims to adjust themselves to the changing conditions. They, therefore, advocated not only Western education but also new ways of life introduced into India with the establishment of the East India Company.

In spite of his earlier religious and non-worldly inclinations, Hali was so influenced by Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan's views that, responding to the need of the moment, he became an active reformist. This makes it possible to distinguish two distinct phases in the development of

Hali's thought. During the first period of his literary life, which covers his early twenties, his genius was dwarfed by the traditional and stylized poetry of the day. The conventional *ghazals* he wrote are, however, of considerable literary value and ideologically significant.

Coming into close contact with Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Hali became increasingly aware of the deplorable social conditions of the Muslims and apprehensive about the decadent Muslim society and the social and political annihilation towards which it was drifting. The extraordinary change in Hali's thought found expression in the epoch-making long poem, "The Ebb and Flow of Islam," popularly known as the *"Musaddas."* This poem reveals unusual creative imagination and sound common sense. However, since Hali's social thought is mostly concerned with practical problems, we shall deal first with Hali's ideas on education.

Hali believed that education was very essential for Indians and had become especially so for the Muslims since they had ceased to be members of the ruling class. Their political downfall had resulted in a harsh and abrupt deterioration and general decay. Education was in the context of the times no longer just a cultural adornment; it had become a necessity and a means of becoming efficient and achieving equality and respect. He laid particular emphasis on education in the professional and agricultural spheres. While fully realizing its immense importance and utility, he saw its limitations. In this connection he reasoned and came to the same conclusions as many social scientists, namely, that non-utilitarian education had been given too much importance. Education was not always an absolute blessing, for often it gave young people false notions about their status. Hali in his *"Mussaddas"* says that it would have been far better if these people were not educated at all, for filled with their own superiority, they look down upon professions other than government posts. Perhaps, these people, Hali says, might have done well in trade or other professions, had they not acquired false and irrational ideas. Humorously, rather sarcastically, Hali defines this kind of education as compounded ignorance and the university as a factory for the production of mere clerks.

Hali, however, urged the importance of an education that would socialize the individual and at the same time develop his personal character. A good education would do more to lend nobility to a man's character than mere birth or heritage. Like Aristotle Hali laid stress on both knowledge and morality. Education should not only develop

the latent abilities of a man but also enable him to lead a virtuous life and to achieve a higher ideal of morality.

One of the developed aspects of Hali's social thought is his ideas relating to religion. Though early in life Hali's beliefs were narrow-mindedly and fanatically orthodox later he seems to have differentiated between the tenets of Islam and those excrescences that had taken root among the Muslims. He saw for himself how far the Muslims had digressed from the simplicity of Islam and the teachings of the Quran. He enumerates interesting superstitions:—

> While drinking water bare-headed, one should place one's hand on the head. One should never visit anyone on Wednesdays. A bride's dress should be sewn by seven women whose husbands are alive. If you get hiccups somebody is thinking of you. The 3rd, 13th, 23rd and 28th are evil dates.

According to the teachings of Islam Hali believed in an omnipotent divine power, whose supreme sovereignty could not be questioned. He, therefore, raised his voice against pseudo-religionism, shrine-worship and stupid customs and usages. The blind reverencing of *Imams, Walis* and *Sufis* had become an important feature in Muslim social and religious thought and life. The veneration given to them did not follow from any real merit but varied with the extent of ignorance among their followers. Popular belief had made them mediators between the people and God. The common people as well as the educated classes looked upon them as a source of blessing, capable of miraculous healing powers in the case of physical diseases and spiritual consolation in the matter of mental worries. Seeking to resolve the incongruities between the true spirit of Islam and the collective behaviour of the Muslims, Hali advised the followers of Islam not to beseech help from anybody except God, who is "The King of all kings." He warned people not to be carried away by their emotions and sentiments. Hali quoted the teachings of the holy Prophet bringing home the simplicity of Islam and also that the essence of religion was the preservation of high moral virtues.

In an age characterized by religious fanaticism, Hali revealed a rare philosophical bent of mind and great philosophic vision. His concern with sceptical ideas can be traced to his study of the works of the sceptical-minded and agnostic Persian poets like Omar Khayyam. Why, for instance, he questioned, was the universe created? When was it created? How is one responsible for "good" and "evil?" Why is there so much misery, ignorance, hatred, crime, disease, warfare, in-

gratitude, selfishness and so on, especially under an omnipotent and merciful God? Hali frankly admitted that neither the theologian nor the physicist, in spite of perpetual searching, had ever found a satisfactory answer. "In spite of the fact that man has been able to discover many facts and laws from the earth as well as from the water, the mysteries of nature are eternally hidden."

Hali's approach to religion was both practical and utilitarian. He believed in the basic simplicity of religion and its great potentiality as a moral force. He rated a man's moral qualities and character much higher than his beliefs. Indeed he was so advanced in this particular view that he refused to consider one's duty to God comprised merely prayers, holy pilgrimages and fasting; it was rather the fulfilment of one's duty to mankind. He openly stated that no religious formality was of any value unless one was sympathetically inclined to humanity. He even went so far as to make the revolutionary statement that the pilgrimage to the holy Kaaba must follow, not precede, the pilgrimage in India, namely social and welfare work for one's countrymen. The essence of religion, according to Hali, was goodwill to all.

As regards the welfare of women, Hali's ideas relating to marriage deserve attention. His views on marriage seem to be decades ahead of his contemporaries. He emphasizes that compatibility of temperament and the social and moral characteristics of the two people should be the deciding factors and not the economic wealth, the geographical proximity or even their racial characteristics. In a poem *"Betion Ki Nisbat"* (The Betrothal of Daughters), in his *Diwan-e-Hali,* he denounces the general practice in the Muslim community of marrying a daughter into a well-to-do household, noted for its family honour, irrespective of the inclinations, attitudes and interests of the young people. He further expands his views in *"Chup ki Dad"* (Tribute to Silence). In this famous poem Hali foresees that the education and advancement of women is essential for the development of the country. He rallies womanhood therefore to assert itself, play its role, and claim its rightful position in society.

In *"Munajat-e-Bewa"* (Widow's Plaint) Hali describes the pitiable condition of an Indian widow, who is stigmatized on the death of her husband, is considered a burden and often ill-treated. A widow has no status in society at all. Although religion and law do not forbid widow remarriage, social pressure, customs and traditions prevent her from doing so. Besides she is forbidden to participate in auspicious ceremonies like a marriage lest she bring ill luck. She is closely watched

for any untoward behaviour and readily condemned.

Hali, however, conforms to the purely Indian social tradition of keeping women in *purdah*. He feels society will not lose anything if women remain segregated from the society of men, so long as they have opportunities to attend to the work of the household and to tend to their children, for which they have a natural aptitude. To support his views he says that this would prevent any unnecessary suspicion among men who are not accustomed to non-*purdah*, and at the same time this seclusion would naturally bring the women closer to their husbands and children. In one of his essays *"Iltemas bekhidmat-e-Bradaran-e-Watan Motalliq-e-Masla-e-Hijab"* (An Appeal to Brother Citizens Concerning the Problem of *Purdah*) Hali in fact defends this pattern of culture, which, according to him, the society must uphold. He could not foresee that changing conditions and the education of women would outdate this system.

Hali had a realistic attitude towards the beggar problem. He traced the cause of this evil to the failure to make provision for a new way of living for these people. He deplored the contemporary situation in India, where thousands of able-bodied men and women moved about the country begging under false pretences. Hali was of the opinion that society itself was largely responsible for such a situation. People gave alms irresponsibly, often merely to get rid of them, sometimes in the hope of a reward in the life hereafter. In Hali's writings we find several references to this problem which is acute even in our times. In one of his quatrains (rendered freely) he says:—

> I once reproved a beggar, who claimed alms of me. Though young and lusty, he begged shamelessly saying, "Reprove the foolish whose misplaced charity encourages all beggars not we who beg."

Hali also tackles the problem of poverty and stresses the need for social justice. In two of his poems *"Gadayan-e-Qaom"* (Beggars of the Nation) and *"Targhib-e-Ghariban"* (An Incentive to Assist the Poor) he writes of the maldistribution of wealth. He advocates the passing of Poor Laws and suggests ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency. He is surprisingly modern in his approach to the practical solution of these problems.

Apart from these general problems Hali was much interested in the general behaviour and conduct of the individual in society. He gave due importance to all the traits that make an individual personality, though they are not ordinarily considered significant. He deals with a variety of subjects; punctuality, a sense of responsibility, the

acquisition of knowledge, the blessings of unity and so on. He denounces moral weaknesses such as cowardice, malice, slander, apathy, complacency and pride. He advocates self-help, moderation, good-will to all, courage, industry, effort and prayer, religious toleration and many other virtues. At other places he explains that wealth is transitory, that inordinate expenditure is dangerous, that learning and conduct are a better capital than wealth or grandeur, that virtue and vice go together, and so on. His great poem *"Mussaddas,"* is full of these and similar ideas. James Lyall has rightly said of Hali: "Never have the vices and shortcomings of a people been lashed by one of themselves with more vigorous denunciation, or more earnestness of moral purpose."

Besides dealing specifically with different aspects of human behaviour, Hali also lays great stress on forgiveness. He opposes the age-old concept of revenge expressed in the well-known saying, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." He is much nearer to the philosophy of Jesus Christ, Gautama Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi and preaches forgiveness particularly when one is powerful enough to retaliate. In one of his quatrains he says:—

> Moses prayed, "Almighty One, make Thou Thy pleasure plain, Who foremost of Thy servants will Thy favour obtain?" There issued the commandment, "Lo, favoured shall be he, who, though occasion offers, doth from revenge abstain."

Hali's philosophy of forgiveness can be summed up in one line: "Let us shun harm and offer good for all evil deeds."

Hali's eagerness to arouse a slumbering and indifferent nation, degenerating rapidly, led him to cover every aspect of human behaviour and conduct in society. In his great works, both prose and poetry, he ably portrayed the past glories of Islam and Islamic society. He exposed the deplorable conditions of contemporary society and frankly criticized prevailing vices and shortcomings in the hope of leading the Muslims back to, what he considered, the right path to progress. Contrasting and comparing the past with the present, Hali made a positive and important contribution to social thought by his clear insight into the multiple factors that create social problems and his suggestions to solve these problems.

FATIMA SHUJA'AT

THE ANALOGY OF THE IMAGE

[**Shri G. Srinivasan,** Lecturer in Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, writes an interesting and lucid essay on the different ways in which the great schools of philosophy have used the analogy of the image to explain the mutual relations of orders of reality. He examines in this respect Plato, the Sānkhya school, Leibnitz and the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva. So much of our experience in the manifested world is of the nature of beholding our image "on the waves of space" : a right discrimination of image and reality is of utmost spiritual importance.—Ed.]

Philosophy, in the traditional sense, is the search for Ultimate Reality. This search is very often intuitive and not merely intellectual. But the construction of the system of philosophy is always intellectual and the two ways in which the intellect works are inference (*anumāna*) and analogy (*upamāna*). Analogy seems to be as important and necessary as inference in the intellectual construction of philosophical systems, since what cannot be proved or directly described can perhaps be suggested through comparison; so much so that philosophers of both East and West have often resorted to comparisons, parables and myths, and without these philosophical literature would be much poorer in its import.

One such analogy which is frequently employed by philosophers is the analogy of the image. It is, however, used differently by different philosophers and it will be interesting to note its significance in some of the systems.

Plato uses the analogy of the image for the first time in the history of European thought. In his *Republic* and *Phaedo,* he refers to sense-objects as the "copies" or images of their Ideas, which are original and perfect. The sense-objects are said to "imitate" the Ideas which are their formal and final cause. "Imitation," however, does not imply (for Plato) either distortion or negation of the Ideas; it implies, on the other hand, an affirmation and functional immanence of the Ideas in the sense-objects, whereby the sense-objects are said to "participate" in the reality of the Ideas so as to partake of their perfection. But "participation" is never complete, and hence the sense-objects always remain *imperfect* images or imitations of the Ideas.

The analogy of the image thus employed by Plato clearly implies that there is both identity and difference between the sense-object and the Idea. There is identity between them inasmuch as the sense-object "participates" in the reality of the Idea and partakes of its perfection,

whereby it becomes qualitatively similar to the Idea. There is difference between them inasmuch as the sense-object belongs to a different ontological order and hence necessarily falls short of the perfection of the Idea which it tries to imitate. The difference between the sense-object (image) and the Idea (original) is thus *ontological* or *substantive,* while the identity between them is *qualitative,* and also *functional,* since the sense-object is what it is qualitatively because of the functional immanence of the Idea in it. Both the identity and the difference have a necessary part to play in the spiritual evolution of the soul as described by Plato. Because of the identity, the sense-objects "suggest" to the soul the presence of perfect Ideas; because of the difference, they necessitate the soul's withdrawing from the sense-world so as to contemplate the Ideas.

Both identity and difference are together present in the relation of dependence found between the sense-object and the Idea, as between the image and the original. This relation of dependence in Plato's philosophy is, however, one-sided and not mutual. That is, the image (sense-object) depends on the original (Idea) for being what it is, but not *vice versa.* Even if it can be said that the original requires the image for its own manifestation—as Aristotle later seems to have pointed out—this does not establish the dependence of the original on the image, but only its inseparable relation with the image. The very fact that the original chooses to manifest itself in the image proves its independence from the image, since the original thereby grants existence to the image and sustains it. Thus Plato seems to have used the analogy of the image in order to suggest the dependence of sense-object on the Idea as also the independence of the Idea from the sense-object.

In Indian philosophy Sānkhya makes a significant use of the analogy of the image by positing *mutual reflection*[1] between *Puruṣa* and *buddhi.* Because of the subtlety and proximity of *buddhi* to *Puruṣa,* each is reflected in the other. This *mutual reflection* has significance to both *Puruṣa* and *buddhi*: as a result of *Puruṣa*'s reflection in *buddhi,* the unconscious (*acetana*) *buddhi* behaves as if it were conscious; as a result of the reflection of the modifications of *buddhi* in *Puruṣa,* the unacting (*akartṛ*) *Puruṣa* becomes the experient (*bhoktṛ*) of the world. Thus the theory of *mutual reflection* in Sānkhya seems to bridge

[1] Only Vijñāna Bhikshu holds the view of mutual reflection in Sānkhya. See *Sānkhya-pravacanabhāṣya* 1. 1 and *Yoga Vārttika* 1. 4, 3.35.

the gulf between the two otherwise independent realities — *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, so as to render the active experience of a living being intelligible.

Mutual reflection implies *mutual dependence*, but this dependence is purely *functional* in Sānkhya and is rightly described as the *andha-pangu-nyāya*. That is, while reflecting the modifications of *buddhi*, the unacting *Puruṣa* depends upon the active *buddhi* for its active experience (*bhoga*); while reflecting *Puruṣa*, the unconscious *buddhi* depends upon *Puruṣa* for its quasi-teleological activity. But each is an original in its own right and hence is ontologically independent of the other.

The question may perhaps be raised whether Sānkhya regards the *mutual reflections* of *buddhi* and *Puruṣa* as illusory. The answer will be obvious if we bear in mind the realistic metaphysics of Sānkhya. The Sānkhyan dual realities — *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* — are both real, and hence their *mutual reflections* which bring about co-operation between them by complementing the defects of both are also real. The reality which Sānkhya accords to its mutual reflections distinguishes the Sānkhya view of mutual reflections of *Puruṣa* and *buddhi* from the Advaita conception of *itaretarādhyāsa* of Brahman and *māyā*. That is, while Advaita Vedanta believes that what is an image or reflection is necessarily false and illusory, and hence can only be interpreted as *adhyāsa* or *āropita* (a superimposition), Sānkhya, being dualistic and realistic, maintains the reality of reflections of its dual realities. In Sānkhya reflection in itself is not illusory, but only its mistakenly asserted non-difference from the original.

The Sānkhyan view of dependence, based as it is on the analogy of the image or reflection, implies both identity and difference between the original and the image. There is identity between *Puruṣa* and its reflection in *buddhi* in the sense that *Puruṣa* is thereby functionally present in *buddhi* and consequently the inherently unconscious *buddhi* is rendered conscious; there is again identity between the modifications of *buddhi* and their reflections in *Puruṣa* in the sense that the modifications of *buddhi* thereby come to be functionally present in *Puruṣa* so as to constitute *Puruṣa*'s experience. On the other hand, *Puruṣa* differs from its reflections in *buddhi* in the sense that *Puruṣa* always stands apart ontologically or substantively so as to be capable of withdrawing its own reflection; similarly the modifications of *buddhi* differ from their reflections in *Puruṣa* ontologically, since they are of prākṛtic origin and content. Sānkhya can be thus said to posit

functional identity and *ontological* difference between the original and image.

Another philosopher who bases his philosophy on "reflection" is Leibnitz. In his system, each monad is a spiritual centre reflecting the rest of the world and the world consists of an infinite number of such monads. Each monad, hence, not merely reflects the other monads but is infinitely reflected in the other monads. In the pluralism of Leibnitz, we are thus presented with multiple reflections, unlike the mutual reflections of the dualistic Sānkhya. This, however, makes no difference to the nature of relation between the image and the original. The relation is one of dependence and dependence implies both identity and difference between them. In the philosophy of Leibnitz, the identity between the image (perception of the subject-monad) and the original (the object-monad) is, however, only a *cognitive* identity, since the image or reflection comes to be identified with another monad (object) in the subject's knowledge. The difference between them, however, is *ontological,* since no two monads are substantively the same. One special feature of the Leibnitzian *multiple reflections,* however, is that the reflection — apart from its own dependence on the original (object) — grants reality to subject, since the very reflective activity of the subject is the reality of its subjecthood.

In the Dvaita Vedanta of Madhva the relation of Brahman to the finite self is sometimes likened to the relation of the original to the image (*bimba-pratibimba sambandha*). Even here the purpose of this analogy is to suggest the dependence of the finite self on Brahman, and, as in the other systems, dependence implies both identity and difference: there is identity between the finite self and Brahman inasmuch as the finite self possesses the qualities of knowledge and enjoyment like Brahman. But the finite self ontologically differs from Brahman since it belongs to a dependent order of existence wherein it can acquire perfection only in accordance with its own intrinsic *yogyata* (fitness). Dvaita system thus accepts *qualitative* identity and *ontological* difference between the original (Brahman) and the image (the finite self). The identity, however, is also *functional,* since the finite self (image) is functionally dependent on Brahman (original) for its existence, activity and enjoyment. It is also believed that Brahman (original) grants separate — though dependent — existence to its own image (finite self) for the sake of *Lila* (play), since *Lila* requires at least two participants.

Thus all these systems seem to have used the analogy of the image to suggest dependence, and dependence is always taken to imply both

identity and difference between the original and the image. Difference is regarded as *ontological* or *intrinsic* in all these systems while identity is regarded either as purely *functional* (Sānkhya) or purely *cognitive* (Leibnitz) or both *qualitative* and *functional* (Plato and Dvaita Vedanta).

Since the ontological difference between the image and the original suggested by the analogy of the image implies the denial of ontological or material continuity between them, this analogy will be out of place in the organismic systems of philosophy, such as Rāmānuja's, which seek to explain dependence between two entities on the basis of continuity of being or organic unity between them; so much so that the use of the analogy of the image seems to be confined to the systems of philosophy which are either pluralistic or dualistic in some sense, while the organismic systems resort to the analogy of the body-and-soul relation (*sarīra-sarīri sambandha*) in order to explain the organic nature of dependence between Brahman and the world.

In all the systems in which the analogy of the image is employed in order to explain dependence between two entities, it may be noted that the image is not a mere duplicate of the original but in some sense or the other is complementary to the nature of the original. In Plato's philosophy, the sense-object (image) lends manifested actuality to the real transcendent Idea (original). In Sānkhya, the reflection of *Puruṣa* in *buddhi* provides the *physical* counterpart to the spiritual and transcendent *Puruṣa*, whereby *Puruṣa* figures as the subject of experience and the goal of *prākṛtic* activity; the reflection of the modifications of *buddhi* in *Puruṣa* renders the physical modifications of *buddhi ideal*, whereby they come actually to affect *Puruṣa* as experience. In the philosophy of Leibnitz, the reflections serve as the *ideal* or *cognitive* counterparts of external real monads, whereby the two come to be identified in the monad's perception of the world. In Dvaita Vedānta the finite self (image), being of limited perfection and dependent (*paratantra*), provides *"difference"* (*bheda*) to Brahman (original) which alone is fully perfect (*pūrṇa*) and independent (*svatantra*).

G. Srinivasan

THE ALBERT SCHWEITZER COLLEGE

[**Mrs. Florence E. Pettit,** who has contributed before to our pages, describes the Albert Schweitzer College set up in Switzerland in recent years and the good work it is doing to keep alive the spiritual and religious values underlying our civilization through lecture courses which stimulate thinking along those lines.—ED.]

IN HIS BOOK *The Decay and Restoration of Civilization* Dr. Albert Schweitzer wrote:—

> The spiritual and religious values underlying our civilization will not remain alive automatically. We must concern ourselves much more in every way to maintain them in existence.

In 1949 a group of men and women who recognized this truth, formed an Association to set up an International Education Centre, the purpose and spirit of which was inspired by Albert Schweitzer's life and teaching.

Under the leadership of Professor H. Casparis of Chur, Switzerland, some thirty to forty people held a study camp in a Youth Hostel in Klosters in 1951, and again in 1952. In the summer of 1953, their committee, feeling the need for a permanent college, inspected a building in Churwalden (Graubunden) which had been used first as an hotel annexe and later as the headquarters of a meat-drying concern. The committee was depressed by the neglected condition of the building, but had vision enough to see its possibilities. After consideration the building was acquired and voluntary workers cleaned it up and installed sanitation. Now double windows have been put in and central heating has made it really comfortable.

Dr. Albert Schweitzer was invited to sponsor the project. In a letter to Professor Casparis in June 1952, he wrote:—

> I find the idea of creating a college according to the principles laid down by yourself and the members of your association an excellent one, and you Swiss are just the right people to carry through a job of this sort. Today, when a dogmatism foreign to its nature has gained such ground in Protestantism that men are beginning to regard Liberalism as a thing of the past, it is particularly salutary that yours will be an institution based on the free religious-ethical spirit.... My heart is with you.

At the present time the Albert Schweitzer College has a membership of six hundred people, who pay initially twenty Swiss Francs, plus an annual sum of five Swiss Francs (£2. plus 10s. annually).

The academic year is divided into three terms, autumn, winter and spring. (This year's course began on October 2nd, 1960.) The aim is always to educate the whole person, and studies are integrated around the two

poles of theoretical analysis and practical application. Language instruction is given in English and German and lectures and discussions employ both these languages, whilst instruction in the French language is also available.

The tradition of the school is one of religious liberalism, which believes in the centrality of the religious dimension in human life, and seeks to restore this by an appreciative exploration and understanding of all men's spiritual experiences. Vital religion is a medium by which new insights may become fully integrated with the personality, and the community comes together regularly for common worship.

The needs of the body are also met; the food is simple, plentiful and good. In summer students play tennis and swim, whilst mountain walks and climbs are possible all through the year with winter sports in season.

The college has set itself the task of educating the WHOLE MAN, both as a free person and as a responsible member of society, the aims being clarity and freedom in faith and thought, plus freedom and moral responsibility in action. Both are seen as anchored in a religious basic-attitude. The brochure reads:—

> We champion the spirit of open-hearted tolerance and it is our desire to co-operate in the building up of a free and peaceful world in which all races and nations work together.
>
> As Christians we work to establish the Christian spirit on earth, in the confidence that the Spirit of God is within us. The ethic of reverence for life, expressing itself as love, is our principle of action.

For those unable to take a full year's course, two separate summer fortnight courses are held. The writer has participated in one such course—one which proved wholly satisfying and delightful.

The theme "The Conscience" was dealt with by three professors, two men and one woman. They dealt in turn with the religious, the psychological and the sociological backgrounds to the subject.

Students usually range in age from eighteen to thirty-five years, but there were a few both younger and older on this course. Fifty students participated. They were drawn from America, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, England, Holland, Germany, France and Switzerland. There was an Oxford professor and his wife, a number of college students, several teachers, a doctor, a writer, a world traveller and a housewife. (For the full year course the number of students accepted is normally not over thirty.)

The fee for this fortnight's course, inclusive of board and tuition, was S. Fr. 150, or £12. 10*s*. The nominal extras were for tennis, swimming and a coach trip.

Lectures were arranged on alternate days. On the other days packed lunches were provided and the whole party usually climbed the mountains together, but these excursions were not compulsory and some people rested, wrote letters, painted or went off on expeditions of their own.

In the evenings the house-party divided to form discussion groups based on the lecture of the morning. The leader of each group gathered questions from his members, and these were answered or otherwise dealt with by the lecturer in the evening.

Churwalden is 4,000 feet up in the mountains, and so it was not too difficult, by winding, climbing footpaths, to reach mountain skihuts at the 6,000 feet or 7,000 feet level for lunch—usually of sausage, cheese, bread and fruit. From here the energetic were able to climb to the snowline, whilst the others rested, or studied the rich bird, animal and plant life of the Alps.

One day the coach visited Bad Ragaz, a fashionable Spa, and the party went by cable car and chair lift to Pizol, a high peak. From here the snow-covered mountains of the Engadine were revealed.

I will never forget my solitary ascent in the gaily coloured chair lift. Gradually the cable rises, lifting the occupant slowly, silently, upwards, suspended in time and space. Below I could see chalets and peasants mowing grass with hand-scythes. My feet skimmed gently over the top of the pine forest, where red squirrels played and roe deer leapt. Far below, the ribbon of the Rhine, with towns, villages and churches strung along its banks, wound through the valley.

As the gaily coloured chair drew me steadily higher, past the tree line, deep blue gentians and other alpine flowers were revealed in the grass. Glancing at my watch I saw that an hour had passed since I began the ascent, yet it had seemed an eternity before I stepped out beside a cold blue mountain lake. Wreaths of misty cloud obscured a mountain hut, towards which we hurried for hot drinks. But the mist passed and the terrace of the hut was sheltered and bathed in golden sunshine. We had cold drinks, and ate our brown bread and soft Swiss cheese, gazing at the peaks once more revealed solid, stable and enduring. Small things were forgotten. Nothing mattered here. All was peace, harmony and a deep contentment. Tensions, frictions, worries and doubts had dissolved in illimitable space.

But one cannot live for ever on the mountain tops. One has to descend ultimately. So also we had to leave the college when our time was up.

Experiences there were very valuable. I recall the classical music played softly in the lounge on gramophone records of an evening. I remember the fellowship and fun, and my bedroom with its lovely view down the valley.

From here at the same hour each morning I watched an old woman in peasant garb drive her cow to richer pasture, the enormous bell hanging from its neck by a leather collar, clanging melodiously. I watched small birds busily feeding on the cone-hung fir trees. I remember the evening when the whole of the British group gathered in my room to discuss and rehearse a charade we were to act on the last evening, this being our contribution to the International party.

I see again my young son coming to me with shining eyes to talk about the yodelling he had heard, and the fondue supper he had eaten ceremonially. I recall with pleasure the dipper (a water bird) bobbing on a stone beside a rushing waterfall, and the wild raspberries, strawberries and bilberries we picked as we ascended the mountain one very hot day.

In my mind's eye I see again the young women who each morning in the bathroom endeavoured to wash and iron their clothes, take showers or make themselves beautiful while they carried on an animated conversation in various tongues. How we all argued and with what friendly spirit we sometimes agreed to differ. Most of all perhaps I remember the kindness and consideration of the lecturers who were so patient with immature seekers after truth.

I believe the A.S.C., as it is affectionately called, will go from strength to strength, for it stands for the things the world so sorely needs today. My purpose in writing this article is to make it better known, for there are many who would profit by a course there, and many more perhaps who have some contribution of international understanding, or contemporary thought, to make there.

FLORENCE E. PETTIT

FILM

The moving shadows on the screen
Express emotions magnified,
Project the selves of those who watch
And all that they desire to be.

They see their souls, but twice as large,
And drabness change to vivid hues
Until the fantasy dissolves
And back in focus moves the truth.

HERBERT BLUEN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

"THE FIRST FIVE LIVES OF ANNIE BESANT"*

As ONE of those who first came across Dr. Annie Besant in the capacity of an adversary in a legal battle concerning Shri J. Krishnamurthy (now a world celebrity) and as a person who, thereafter, had the good fortune of collaborating with her in her educational and political work during the fateful years of the Home Rule League and the National University preceding the freedom struggle inaugurated by Gandhiji, I may remark that the first perusal of Arthur Nethercot's *The First Five Lives of Annie Besant* came as a tremendous shock. Mr. Nethercot, as he has stated in the Preface, met me in order to obtain some particulars regarding those years when I was privileged to work with Dr. Besant and I gave him all the information in my possession. Others, including the late Shri B. P. Wadia, had also talked to Mr. Nethercot. Mr. Nethercot has also quoted from Mr. Wadia's writings, but the close intimacy between Dr. Besant, Mr. Wadia and Mr. Arundale was a feature of her Indian sojourn.

Men of my generation, who were amazed spectators of the new style of biography initiated by Lytton Strachey, had realized that painstaking research and a clear and lambent style could be utilized in the art of "debunking," *i.e.*, of not selecting merely the great achievements of notable persons and the highlights of lofty character and great resolve, but also of concentrating on and revealing physical peculiarities, mental foibles and basic, or even superficial, defects of character. Such writers thus lay great emphasis on the reactions to environments, sometimes noble and sometimes petty, which human beings, in their pilgrimage through life, inevitably present to the meticulous searcher of obscure details. Writers of comprehensive genius like Shakespeare, Cervantes and our own Valmiki, while noting that each human being has potentialities alike of the divine and the diabolic in him or her, have produced character-sketches which maintain adequate perspectives and a sense of balance. It was Horace Walpole, himself a witty chronicler, who in one of his letters observed, "This world is a comedy to those that think and a tragedy to those that feel."

Such are the observations that occur to one as one studies this book. No one can fail to remark the clarity of Mr. Nethercot's style, the comprehensive and painstaking scrutiny of written material and even of gossip that he has displayed or the apparently balanced and judiciously discriminating attitude that he has adopted; but, on laying down the book after perusal, I, for one, was forced to recollect a line of Wordsworth, "We live by admiration, hope and love," and to conclude that the same material and the same events could have been so interpreted and so expounded that the character emerging from the pages of such a book appeared as that of a noble if also an impetuous seeker of the truth as she saw it, of one who accounted no sacrifice too great to fulfil her vision, of one who was never moved by detraction and misinterpretation and, at the same time, never placed an uncharitable con-

* *The First Five Lives of Annie Besant*. By ARTHUR H. NETHERCOT (University of Chicago Press. 419 pp. 1960. $7.50)

struction on her neighbour's motives or actions, and, finally, of one who never hesitated to plunge into a struggle, albeit it was desperate, to carry out in practice the theories and the ideals which she adopted and cherished for the time being. The personage, however, that emerges from this study is a much more calculating and vacillating character than the one which was presented to some of us. It is a pity that talents like Mr. Nethercot's, with his infinite capacity for taking pains, should have resulted in a book which one would not like to re-peruse often, this being the test of every really great literary production. It is to be hoped that the sequel to this book in which the author proposes to deal with Dr. Besant's Indian phase will, while displaying all his literary and psychological merits, evince a more sympathetic interpretation of Dr. Besant's self-fulfilment in India.

The book ends with an account of the Chicago Parliament of Religions and deals with the influence of Professor Gnanendranath Chakravarti on Dr. Besant as well as of Herbert Burrows. Mr. Nethercot refers to Chakravarti's ascendency over Dr. Besant and says that "she adopted him and he adopted her for their mutual psychic development." The book concludes with this sentence:—

> Having renounced politics on her conversion to Theosophy, she had no idea that she was eventually to have a political career that was for a time to make her one of the most notable and remarkable figures in the dramatic movement for Indian Home Rule.

In a very instructive Appendix, the author refers to the warm and easy friendliness of Dr. Besant's approach to people, her rigorous work habits and her willingness to learn from others. And so ends a book which is a breathless story of the variegated life of one who was both a stormy petrel and a commanding personality. This biography is remarkable, and would have been memorable if a little more kindliness and a little more faith in human nature had been exhibited by the talented author.

C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

"HINDU AND MUSLIM MYSTICISM"*

This volume comprises eight lectures delivered under the Louis H. Jordan Bequest at the School of Oriental and African studies in the University of London. The lectures have been equally divided between Hindu and Muslim mysticism.

There is no doubt that the study of mysticism is beset with great difficulties. Mysticism is not the uniform phenomenon it is generally supposed to be. There are types and varieties of mystic experience. It is erroneous to confine mystic experience to the experience of identity with Godhead. It can be as much of absolute transcendence as of immanence. Hence no religion worthy of its name can be without a mystic element: a non-rational experience of a direct encounter with the ultimate. It is also natural that mystic experience, which claims to involve other dimensions of existence, should have both sound and morbid phases. The Muslim mystic's experience of *bast* or expansion, for example, may be only a phase of circular insanity or really correspond to something in Reality

* *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism.* By R. C. Zaehner. (The University of London: The Athlone Press, London; Orient Longmans, India. 234 pp. 1960. 30*s*.)

which has evoked this state of mind.

It would be very unfair, however, to judge a form of mystic experience which is alien to us with the categories which have been worked out on a totally different plane of human experience. It is strange that Dr. Zaehner should see the Quranic Allah only as a transcendent Deity, whereas the *Quran* explicitly emphasizes the proximity of God and His concern with man. However transcendent He may be in His essence, the very fact that He is a Person who answers to our calls in afflictions and who faces us wheresoever we turn makes the Quranic God as much intimate as ultimate. How far then is the assertion justified that the *Quran* does not allow any mystic interpretation? The Orientalists of the older school have always laboured to seek non-Islamic sources to explain the development of the Sufi movement. But now they are coming more and more to realize that much of the Sufi attitude, (leaving aside, of course, some decadent and exaggerated manifestations) is the development of what is already latent in the *Quran*. But our writer is an able advocate of the old school of thought.

A culture or religion is never a finished product. It always allows for development. In the course of its history it encounters other cultures, and is both active and receptive in relation to them. Islam cannot be an exception. The question is whether the Sufi movement is only an alien accretion and the attempt of many Sufis to work out a reconciliation with orthodoxy is only a pretension. Even rigorous orthodoxy later came to see that the experiences of the Sufis, however blasphemous they might appear, have some genuine metaphysical roots. After this the orthodox did not deny the genuineness of the mystic experience but challenged the propriety of expressions of it which could easily give rise to social instability and moral latitude.

Dr. Zaehner asserts that experiences of the type with which the name of Abu Yazid al-Bistami is associated are in complete conflict with the Islamic world of ideas and can be historically proved to be derived from Vedantic sources. We submit that the historical and philological approach to the problem of mysticism has even more serious limitations than the psychological. Apart from the fact that the historical evidence in this case is not convincing to at least one student of Sufi thought, we cannot see why the same mystic experience cannot be repeated in more than one period of history and in more than one milieu of culture, if we admit the possibility that it is evoked by a genuine encounter with some phases of Reality.

We also feel that the writer's treatment of al-Ghazali does scant justice to this great figure of Islam. The man who has left one of the most interesting documents of spiritual adventure and who employed the method of doubt before Descartes and initiated the critique of causality before Hume deserves more indulgence. But, however deep our differences may be on other issues, we are in full sympathy with the writer in his onslaught against the monist's pretension of identity, especially if it is taken at its face value without any explanation or qualification.

It is clear that Dr. Zaehner has made a painstaking study of comparative mysticism. Both for its admirable analysis of Hindu Mysticism and for its penetrating study of various phases of Sufi thought, his work can be hailed as a real achievement.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. Edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN and P. T. RAJU. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 383 pp. 1960. 42*s.*)

Mankind must unite or perish: this is a truth which is becoming obvious not only to thinkers but to every newspaper reader. But to unite we must understand each other. The barriers to mutual understanding are supposed to be transcended on the intellectual plane, and yet it is precisely on that plane that we feel most acutely how very foreign foreigners are, as anyone has noticed who has attended international congresses.

This book is a brave attempt to overcome mutual alienation. In it different specialists deal with the concept of man in four different traditions (religions and philosophies), J. Wild choosing Greek thought, A. J. Heschel Jewish thought, W. T. Chan Chinese thought and P. T. Raju Indian thought. The topics suggested to the contributors were: Man and Nature; Man and Society; Man and the Divine Spirit; Man and Evolution; the Constitution of the Human Individual; Man and His Life's Ideals; Influence on Religious Traditions; Education.

The omission of Christianity and Islam is more remarkable than either justifiable or justified, especially when so many Indian sects and schools are given in considerable detail, with the result that Indian thought outweighs disproportionately every other kind of thought. The lion's share is by P. T. Raju, who has contributed not only the longest section, that on Indian thought, but also an Introduction and a chapter of "Comparisons and Reflections." In these he tries to show that in spite of his differences man is fundamentally one, in particular that East and West (an absurd division even geographically) can really meet, and that the different traditions do not so much conflict with as complement each other. His synthesis does to a certain extent overcome the tendency for all understanding to be abolished by the accumulation, in a comparatively small compass, of so many different modes of understanding. Had Christianity been included he might have got more clearly the concept of man which is most relevant to our times — that of a creature who is never "all there" but whose nature is largely in the future instead of being the finished if imperfect article he is for Aristotle, for example. The comparison between Christian and Indian mysticism would also have been interesting. (The moral fervour to be found in the Jewish tradition can scarcely be called mysticism.) However, he is to be congratulated on not only presenting his subject with the carefulness of the scholar so that ancient and modern cannot be confused, but venturing also to think out the complex and hoary problems he presents so that the relevance of the ancient to the modern may be discerned. This is a combination which is not too common in historians of philosophy.

PHILIP LEON

The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel. By J. BRONOWSKI and BRUCE MAZLISH. (Hutchinson of London. xviii+522 pp. 1960. 30*s.*)

All thoughtful people are acutely aware that the growth of a contemporary culture depends on a central problem: that of finding common ground between the humanities and science. In 1953, Dr. Bronowski was appointed Carnegie Visiting Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. There he met a teacher in

the Department of Humanities, Mr. Bruce Mazlish. Both authors felt the need for an intellectual history that would trace dominant ideas and plot the course of social movements.

This carefully planned study is the result of their collaboration. It covers the whole range of Western intellectual activity over a period of four hundred years, from the Renaissance to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Lord Acton maintained that history should be thought of as the spiritual part of literature, be an instrument of vision, and the authors have adopted a similar viewpoint.

Their survey is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes "The Expanding World" from 1500 to 1630, embracing the thought of men like Leonardo da Vinci, Machiavelli, Thomas More and Erasmus, whose thought may be said to epitomize the struggles and aspirations of their time. The second section covers the period from 1630 to 1760 and is named "The Age of Reasoned Dissent." The Puritan Revolution and the Royal Society are scrutinized; and minds such as those of Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau are used as the emblems of eras. Part three is devoted to "The Great Revolutions" — that is, the Industrial Revolution, the American and French Revolutions, and to the thought of men like Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham, Robert Owen, Hegel and Kant.

As they sum up their findings, the authors state on p. 502:—

> We have reached an odd conclusion: that there is a tradition of Western thought since the Renaissance, which is a tradition of dissent — that is, a tradition of questioning what is traditional. Yet, this conclusion is not as paradoxical as it seems. For we have found that ideas do not follow a simple progression, and their history is not a featureless avenue. History is made in conflict, and the history of ideas is a conflict of minds.

This book is a remarkably lucid study of great minds. Those selected for purposive analysis seem generally to be the right ones; and if some outstanding thinkers (such as Spinoza and Loyola) have been left out, the main arguments are not affected. This book is undoubtedly what its authors intended it to be, namely, a living map of that intellectual territory which furnishes most of the ideas by which we now live and work.

E. W. Martin

Maurice Nicoll: A Portrait. By Beryl Pogson. (Vincent Stuart, Ltd., London. xiii+288 pp. Illustrated. 1961. 35*s*.)

Maurice Nicoll was a dedicated man and this being so an account of his life is an account of the philosophical and psychological system of thought to the teaching of which he dedicated himself. Beryl Pogson, his secretary for many years, tells us that on August 9th, 1921, he made the following entry in his diary: "Teach me — instruct me — shew me the Path, so that I may know certainly — help my great ignorance, illumine my darkness? I have asked a question." The answer came quickly. Two months later news reached him that Ouspensky, Gurdjieff's disciple and representative in England, would shortly arrive and give a course of lectures. Nicoll attended and rushed home in a state of elation to his wife, newly delivered of a child, to tell her that she must come and listen to Ouspensky — "He is the only man who has ever answered my questions."

In 1922 news came that Gurdjieff was about to open an Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man in

an old *château* at Fontainbleau. Maurice Nicoll did not hesitate. He abandoned his psychological practice in Harley Street and went with his wife and child to Fontainbleau. This was the turning point in his life. To the regret of some of his medical colleagues he devoted himself henceforth to the learning and subsequently to the teaching of Gurdjieff's system of psychology. Eventually, and with Ouspensky's approval, Dr. Nicoll acquired his own following and taught them the methods he had learned at Fontainbleau.

Beryl Pogson has performed a difficult task admirably. When a biographer has an intense admiration for his subject, he is liable to give us a rather lopsided picture of him, stripping him of all the little weaknesses and eccentricities which confirm his human status. She has avoided this and the fact that the following quotation appears on the title page of her book shows that she was fully aware of Dr. Nicoll's oddities — "Those born of the Spirit are unpredictable." Maurice Nicoll had a streak of genius in him and the gods who award this gift usually add a few peculiarities in order to redress the balance. I recommend this book, not only as a biography but also for the light it throws on Gurdjieff's teaching. It should attract many readers.

KENNETH WALKER

The Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy. By SARASVATI CHENNAKESAVAN. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay. 164 pp. 1960. Rs. 10.00)

Anyone who attempts to deal with the views of the ancient Indian philosophers has really to perform a double task: he has not only to offer an explanation of their ideas and to translate them into a contemporary idiom and setting, but also to align them with the thought of today and bring out their relevance to it.

As for the first part, this book adequately summarizes the views of the different *āstika darśanas* on the nature of the mind and of knowledge, the relation of the mind to its objects, as also the discipline of the mind. But the various strands, psychological, ontological, epistemological and ethical, that go to make up the tangled skein called the Indian concept of the mind do not seem to have been unravelled. So also the omission of the heterodox views is inexcusable, for no picture of the Indian concept of the mind can be complete without a reference to them.

It is in respect of the second task that the book disappoints still more. What, for example, is the relevance of such descriptions of the "contents" of the mind as are found on pp. 44-49, 71-73, etc.?

Coming to the fundamental question of the reality of the "soul," which, according to the author, is the basic difference between the Indian and the Western approaches, the evidence suggested, *viz.*, the implications of *suṣupti* and ESP (pp. 134 ff.) is too tenuous and the objections against it worth discussing. What is meant by mind being a "higher" or subtler form of matter? How can the dualism of mind and matter, and again of mind and soul, be sustained on Advaita premises? Many similar questions continue to vex the reader's mind after he lays aside the book.

A. K. JIANDANI

An Introduction to General Metaphysics. By GOTTFRIED MARTIN. Translated by EVA SCHAPER and IVOR LECLERC. With a Foreword by DAVID ROSS. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 156 pp. 1961. 18*s*.)

This seems to me a very good book — lucid, penetrating, progressive, although sometimes, perhaps, a trifle repetitiously and superfluously interpretative of aptly quoted texts. Notwithstanding that the greater part of the book is devoted to the Platonic Idea, the title is entirely suitable. For the main concern of the author is to illuminate the profound continuity in the Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as exhibiting that kind of metaphysics which is not merely possible, but actual and imperishable. Whereas the early Platonic dialogues search for and glimpse the general, and the middle Platonic dialogues dogmatically assert the transcendental being of the general, the later Platonic dialogues, and then the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, tirelessly and fearlessly expose all the seemingly insuperable difficulties that seem to attach to whatever answers may be proposed as to the nature of the being of the general, and then as to the nature of being itself. It is precisely such indefatigable criticism of metaphysical assertions, rather than persistence, however ingenious and eloquent, in metaphysical dogmatism, that is alone the kind of metaphysics that Professor Martin would commend, and metaphysics of this sort does indeed seem inseparable from the nature of man:—

> In saying this I do not wish to deny that the problems of metaphysics are among those problems which do not admit of final and definitive solutions. Metaphysical questions come up against the limits of thought and the limits of language.

In this well-shaped book, so agreeably translated, Professor Martin expresses a philosophical movement that seems to me of the first importance, despite all our contemporary empirical, linguistic challenges of which evidently Professor Martin is not unaware.

M. KAYE

Shri Krishna, His Philosophy and His Spiritual Path. By BAHADUR MAL. (Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur. 334 pp. 1960. Rs. 4.00)

Vast indeed is the literature on the *Gītā*, both ancient and modern. The *Gītā* is a poem as well as a scripture, with teachings religious as well as philosophical. To scholars and mystics alike, the task of finding the thread of unity in it amidst ideas theistic and pantheistic, esoteric and exoteric, and varying pathways to salvation, has proved difficult. This work tries to avoid subjective dogmatism of every kind and is content to expound in lucid terms an eclectic system of philosophy of an ethical, pantheistic type.

Of the three parts in this work, the most notable is the first, which ably vindicates the saintly personality of Sri Kṛṣṇa as against the doubts of historical scholars. Part II is concerned mainly with explaining the ideas of the *Gītā* about God, and the Ultimate Goal. The different pathways to salvation are treated in Part III.

Throughout, the book strikes us as an intelligent and unbiased study of the *Gītā* in the light of modern thought and is welcome as attempting a kind of synthesis which is now badly needed in *Gītā* studies. But we miss here a consideration of the orthodox views of the Indian Ācāryas and the actual passages from the *Gītā* on which the study is based. The style is lucid, but not un-

critical, popular and yet not unscholarly. The book is thus a notable addition to modern Indian studies of the *Gītā*.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

The Bhagavad-Gita. Abridged by T. R. ANANTHARAMAN. (Author, Bangalore. 69 pp. 1960. Rs. 2.00)

The compiler of this English abridgment of the *Bhagavad-Gita* had a special purpose in view, namely, to present the core of the teaching of the *Gita* in a readable, connected narrative form and to reduce the size of the book to suit the comprehension of students unacquainted with Sanskrit. With considerable skill the Scripture has been condensed into half its length. In doing so passages from several chapters of the *Gita* have been shifted from their contexts and strung together in a new order. While it may be helpful to simplify the complexities of the original to make it more easily assimilable by students not trained in metaphysical thinking, one cannot but miss the richness, colour and profundity of the original text. Some of the especially moving passages of the great Scripture, like the *Vishvarupa Darshana* of the eleventh chapter, are truncated and denuded of their grandeur.

The translation is in easy, flowing English and makes pleasant reading; but here again some of the special terms in Sanskrit with their specific connotations fade into pale, colourless English words.

This work is essentially a simplification of a great Scripture which is also a work of art. And, as is inevitable in all such attempts, what is gained in clearness and intelligibility is lost in depth, profundity and inspiration.

D. GURUMURTI

Qur'ānic Ethics. By BASHIR AHMAD DAR. (Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore. 75 pp. 1960. Rs. 2.50)

When we wish to use a walking stick, we do not buy a mace or a bludgeon; and for similar reasons, a pamphlet cannot carry the weight or the substance of a book. A pamphlet should be light, brief, well-planned, and give a general picture without details. In view of the becoming modesty and great learning of the author, it is difficult to be hard on him. In the earlier part of the book, the author deals with the subject in a solid fashion and shows that, in comparison with European systems of ethics, Islamic ethics are mainly a religious system. He then goes on to deal with human freedom; nature and man; the problem of evil; life after death; and the ideal of the good life. The ethics of the Qur'ān are dealt with in a sound fashion, but the comparison with other systems should have been avoided, as there is not sufficient space to deal with the whole subject adequately, for example, to designate Christian ethics as " sordidly individualistic, negative, dogmatic, unprogressive, static" (p. 56), seems uncalled for. The syle is lucid and workmanlike, but occasionally there is a tendency towards heaviness. The pamphlet is in fact the first part of a larger book on the subject, and the author has written it with such learning and understanding that we must defer judgment until the whole is before us.

There is no systematic treatment of Islamic Ethics in any modern language, and we shall await with impatience the author's projected work, which has unfortunately been suspended because of his preoccupation with other duties.

A. A. A. FYZEE

The Holy Sword: The Story of Islam from Muhammad to the Present. By ROBERT PAYNE. (Robert Hale, Ltd., London. 288 pp. Illustrated. 1961. 35*s*.)

To the serious student of Islam the most interesting question raised by such a book as this is what the motives are which led the author to write it and to give it the precise form it has. He has written about Albert Schweitzer, Schliemann the excavator of ancient Troy, Mao-Tse-Tung and the White Rajahs of Sarawak. This is catholicity of taste, even if with some bias to the Oriental. Apart from thinking the public would be interested in such a book, the author has himself presumably felt something of the fascination of the Orient. Yet one wonders how far his assessment of public interest is correct. The whole conception of history is that of a century or more ago, when it was held that the thoughts and feelings of the leading actors determined the course of events. There is no word of economic and social factors, and even the religious factor is very naïvely conceived. To do him justice, Mr. Payne has avoided the erotic aspects of the subject. But one of the impressions his book leaves is of the wide-spread, sometimes diabolical, cruelty of Muslim rulers. This is hardly counterbalanced by his short sections on some of the mystics. Indeed, part of his interest in al-Hallaj, who is given undue prominence, is in the sufferings of his martyrdom. Above all, the title, and the whole treatment, exaggerates one aspect of the achievements of Islamic culture; and nothing is said of the peaceful expansion of Islam by missionary methods. Apart from the faults inevitable in the writing of such a book by one with a superficial knowledge of the subject, the general presentation is not calculated to further real understanding of the Islamic world among English readers.

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

A Survey of Indian History. By K. M. PANIKKAR. (Asia Publishing House, London. xii+272 pp. 8 Plates. 3 Maps. Third ed., reprinted 1960. 25*s*.)

This can justly be called a classic of "popular" history — using the term as praise, in the sense of a happy combination of learning, clarity and interest. Since it first appeared in 1947, it has been reprinted eleven times, the third edition being revised and brought up to date. Useful for general reference, and stimulating for reading, it displays trends and historical patterns, without swamping the reader with too great a mass of detail, though details as highlights are not lacking. In less than three hundred pages (some eight pages comprise a Glossary) it conveys a picture of the "continuity of Indian life . . . the supreme gift of the Himalayan range" that protects and conditions that life. It looks back to the Indus Valley civilization, and brings us, along the twisted strands of conquest and resistance, renaissance and reformation, to the point where India, having gained her Independence, stands on a new threshold, questioning the future. To convey so much, so brilliantly, in a book occupying only three-quarters of an inch on the bookshelf, is indeed noteworthy.

E. W.

A Brief Survey of Mystic Tradition in Religion and Art in Karnataka. By M. V. KRISHNA RAO, Foreword by R. R. DIWAKAR. (Wardha Publishing House, Triplicane, Madras. 217 pp. 1960. Rs. 6.00)

This is an excellent survey of religion and art in Karnataka and of the mystic tradition that gave both their motive power. It is an excellent treatment of the subject in a brief compass. The author reveals a rare understanding and insight into the nuances of Indian religion and art as they have found expression in Karnataka culture. As Dr. R. R. Diwakar points out in his Foreword, "He has covered new ground and opened an avenue of research." The topics treated — Basavesvara, Chennabasava, and other saints like Akka Mahadevi; women in Veerasaiva Society; Sarvajna and other followers of Basava; the Haridasa Movement; Sri Vyasaraja; Sri Purandara Dasa; Nanaka Dasa; mystic influences on art in Karnataka; etc. — reveal the encyclopædic scope of the book and its value as a book of reference.

> The vast and great literature [was] built by a galaxy of great poets and singers since the sixth century A.D. Haridasas, Sivasaranas and Vachanakaras, servants of God as they call themselves, have enriched the life of the people. (p. 216)

This thesis has been ably unfolded by the learned author in his own felicitous style. Students of Indian religion and art in Karnataka will be benefited by this rich exposition of the subject.

M. YAMUNACHARYA

Essays and Introductions. By W. B. YEATS. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. xi+530 pp. 2 Plates. 1961. 36*s*.)

Whether or not one subscribes to all Yeats's opinions and prejudices, his prose writings are vitally compelling through a greatness of mind and vision that arises from the same source as his poetry. In a world of spiritual hesitations and intellectual doubts he stands out like a giant monolith for those single-hearted certainties that never altered, never faltered, through his entire literary life. In his early days he was thought to be a mere regional melodist of the "Celtic twilight"; but Yeats knew, at first perhaps intuitively, later with increasing emphasis, that the Celtic themes were rooted in a broader tradition which knit up legendary figures, beliefs and immortalities down the centuries and across the world. He expressed it in some of the earliest of these reprinted essays — 1897 and 1901; and he stated it plainly in the "General Introduction to My Works" written in 1937 but published now for the first time:—

> Behind all Irish history hangs a great tapestry, even Christianity had to accept it and be itself pictured there. Nobody looking at its dim folds can say where Christianity begins and Druidism ends.

The Christ of this conception was "that Unity of Being Dante compared to a perfectly proportioned human body, Blake's 'Imagination,' what the Upanishads have named 'Self.'" Indeed, Yeats was no parochial Irishman; many of these reprinted Introductions show how deeply he was drawn to Indian thought and poetry, not as some exotic performance but as solving many mystical problems, providing a philosophy that satisfied the intellect, and sharing the profounder features of Western faiths. Just as Shelley, in his own search for a philosophy, had veered from Plato to Buddhistic influence, so Yeats, transparent to the sense of a divine order, was alive to Shelley's understanding. His long essay on "The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry" remains, after sixty years, among the most luminous of interpretations; for we see in it a poet going unhesitantly to the heart of a fellow poet, recognizing that for him too poetry is the essence of life and mean-

ing, and contains in itself all beauty and intellect. "I . . . am now certain," Yeats wrote, "that the imagination has some way of lighting on the truth that the reason has not"; and it was this faculty on his own part that led him to place *Prometheus Unbound* "among the sacred books of the world."

In these collected essays, then, we shall not look for Yeats as a rationalist. We shall find him, rightly enough, concerned with Irish tradition; but always, in his melodious prose, pushing outward to a sweeping circular view of art and literature, and thrusting downward to his immutable conception of poetry and imagination as partaking in the undying themes of earth. He wrote magnificently on Blake, and was, like Blake, a seer.

SYLVA NORMAN

Saint-Exupéry: A Biography. By MARCEL MIGEO. Trs. by HERMA BRIFFAULT. (Macdonald, London. 335 pp. Illustrated. 1961. 30*s*.)

Marcel Migeo's full-scale biography of, and tribute to, his friend and fellow pilot, has been well received in France. Herma Briffault's translation now gives English and American readers the most detailed and substantial book yet done on this legendary airman: Fighter Pilot; "Poet of Flight"; and author of three masterpieces of twentieth-century literature.

Saint-Exupéry disappeared in 1944. He was probably shot down returning to base in Corsica. The truth can never be known, but Marcel's detailed surmise is probably close to the actual sequence of events. Yet truly, for Saint-Exupéry, in his end was his beginning. His two great books of personal experience of flying: *Wind, Sand and Stars* (*Terre des Hommes,* 1939); and *Night Flight* (*Vol de Nuit,* 1931), are still widely read in France and English-speaking countries; both, by common consent, classics of the literature of flying. His *The Little Prince* (*Le Petit Prince,* 1943) is surely due for immortality as one of those rare books for children that are re-read, and read again, throughout one's life.

The early chapters, recounting the events of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's childhood and youth, are deeply interesting, for these early years made the man who was to find the mystical, ecstatic fulfilment of his inmost nature only in the air, above humanity, like his little prince.

His biographer even knows the plane on which the young airman made his first solo flight — "a Sopwith, equipped with a rotary engine." Throughout the book, the temptation to romanticize such a hero of the air is resisted. In fact, his defects are stressed, both as man and airman. One of his weaknesses, preventing him from being "a truly great airman," was his absent-mindedness, "at times fantastic." One of his fears was to be the cause of much emotional stress after his marriage to the talented Consuelo, symbolized, writes M. Migeo, in *The Little Prince,* as the rose. He was afraid of the "stifling" atmosphere of marriage and the tendency for a couple to assume "rights over each other," an idea that to him, so it has been said, was "revolting."

There seems no doubt that one half of Saint-Exupéry's nature was that of the dreamer. Like his Little Prince, he knew, and with the poet's eye he saw, that "what makes the desert beautiful . . . is that somewhere it hides a well." This biography, with its many interesting photographs, will certainly find many appreciative English-speaking readers.

F. SEYMOUR SMITH

Deep Are the Valleys. By HANNAH CLOSS. (The Vanguard Press, New York. 261 pp. 1960. $4.95)

Deep Are the Valleys deals with the religious wars at the end of the twelfth century between the heretic Cathar sect of Southern France and the Roman Catholic Church. The latter at first attempted to win over the Cathars from their heresy by gentle persuasion, but without success. The Cathars, whose faith had affinities with Buddhism, led austere lives and regarded the pomp and luxury surrounding many leading Catholic Churchmen with stern disapproval. At length, realizing that their blandishments were in vain, the Catholics decided to make a "holy" Crusade against the Cathar intransigents, and this novel illustrates forcefully how man with his lust for power and capacity for self-deception has often debased religion and practised inhuman cruelties in its name.

The central character in the story is Wolf, bastard son of the Count of Foix. It was Wolf's ambition to avenge the death of his friend and patron Trencavel, for which Simon de Montfort, leader of the anti-Cathar Crusade, had been responsible. De Montfort, however, is killed by a stone from a catapult and so Wolf's ambition is never realized. Finally, after many adventures, his frustrated lust for vengeance becomes sublimated and he achieves a new vision and tranquillity.

Perhaps Hannah Closs tends rather to overcrowd her "canvas" occasionally, so that the swift-moving and colourful pageantry of the events she depicts becomes blurred. Nevertheless, this novel is a solid and memorable achievement which many lovers of historical fiction will read with great pleasure. It is a loss to literature that the authoress died at a comparatively early age.

HERBERT BLUEN

AIR Miscellany 1960. (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi 6. 156 pp. 1960. Rs. 2.75)

About 45 talks broadcast from AIR stations in 1960 are here brought together, ranged under the headings "Philosophy and History," "Literature and the Arts," "Current Affairs and Science," "Indian Life and Lore" and "Experience and Reminiscence." While the broadcasters are different, the prescribed length of the talks — usually ten or fifteen minutes — stretches them on a sort of Procrustes' Bed, which of course they cannot help. Besides, the talks were meant to be *heard*, not *read* (as here) in small type on large pages. On the other hand, the broadcasters could not actually *see* their far-flung audiences, nor extemporize according to the mood of the moment. The broadcast talk is thus a new literary *genre*, a peculiar product of our synthetic age, and hence calls for special qualities: a sense of proportion, a conversational style and ease in delivery. Talks in English on the air by Indians are seldom satisfactory: the matter is usually too heavy, the delivery too fast, the tone too bullying. Yet, as one reads the talks collected here, one feels that quite a few of them must have both interested and delighted their listeners. Verrier Elwin brings out the symbolism in folk poetry and explains how tribal poetry is "a co-operative, community effort." Detailing his experiences in interviewing candidates, P. S. Sundaram thinks that being nervous during an interview is better than being bold and brassy; but the most important injunction is: "Don't bluff." Malcolm Macdonald talks engagingly on "Bird Watching in Delhi" and Mrs. Mootham on "A Fascinating Occupation" (gar-

dening). Summing up her experiences, Mrs. Mootham says:—

> I wish others could feel like me: creators, when they cut the first rose from their own grafting; cooks, when they mix a salad of their very own; farmers, when their hands are muddy and their hearts weary of the vagaries of the seasons. They may even feel like architects....

Chalapati Rau turns the light of satire on the "socialite," especially the female of the species who, he thinks, "is as deadly as the male. She is capable of greater velocity, and she pirouettes and waltzes better." There is a symposium on "Macaulay: After 100 Years"; there are talks by politicians, historians, scientists, anthropologists, teachers, journalists and experts of all kinds; there are portraits of Dorab Tata and D. K. Karve; and there are expositions of Ramana Maharshi's "message" and Tagore's mysticism. The volume is illustrated, but the format is neither elegant nor handy.

K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar

The Great Peace of Krassnikova: A Novel. By Frank Schaub. Trs. by Kenneth T. Dutfield. (Holborn Publishing, London. 117 pp. 1961. 21*s.* 6*d.*)

This novel is the story of a quiet little Russian village during the Second World War. The author experienced the campaigns in France, Poland and Russia; so he is able to speak from personal knowledge of war-time conditions. He draws a heart-rending picture of normal, kind people (both Russian and German) drawn beneath the Juggernaut of Partisanship and Fascism, and being compelled under "orders" to commit murder and treachery, thereby begetting further murders and treachery.

There is the inevitable love story of the German officer and the Russian girl, tenderly told. But that is of minor importance. The value of the book lies in the deep impression it leaves that war is a folly and unnecessary; an evil thing engendered by governments, ideologies and creeds, to further their own ends; and that, left alone, the "common man," being innately humane, would overcome difficulties of race and language, and live at peace with his neighbours.

The translation by Kenneth T. Dutfield is excellent.

C. B.

Blame where you must, be candid where you can,
And be each critic the Good-natured Man.

—Oliver Goldsmith

PAGAN GONE WEST

[INSTEAD OF his usual "Leaves from a Paris Diary" **Shri Baldoon Dhingra** sends us these musings over his early thoughts and his long stay in the West. "If to respect and revere all beliefs, none of them perfect, is to be a pagan," he says, "then indeed I am a pagan."—ED.]

IF I THINK BACK far enough — and it sometimes seems like yesterday — I see that people wanted something to lean on; indeed, it was thought a good thing. Depended on how we looked at it. The big ones called it faith. I recall Tagore's words: faith is like a child who is not afraid to come into the dark when its mother calls. The little ones — and I know how I felt — wanted a kind of cushion, soft and billowy, for the face to sink in. And I know how comforting it was, as a child, to get lost in the folds of my mother's *sari* and, when taken to task for such unruly behaviour, to burst into torrents of laughter.

Life does not stop. Reality slips through our fingers. The past is but a glowing ash gone cold. One can retain nothing of oneself. Yet Time is not all-powerful. Our life may be only a river rolling on to death, but scraps of existence, islands round which a sandy deposit gathers, sand firm above the general process of a slow destruction. Something still lives deep down in the unconscious memory. Deceived by habit, we are not aware that this is so, but always think that time moves in one direction only. A day comes when we become aware that the flow of time can move backwards. Yes, memory plays the most painful pranks and becomes, in Tagore's words, the priestess that kills the present and offers its heart to the shrine of the dead past.

This faith was a comforting thing. You could be lulled to sleep, or you could just leave all your cares, from a pinprick to a heartache, to it — a downy cushion or else a hard, feathery or snug as time demanded and disposition willed.

I was always told there were countless names of the Lord. I once asked my teacher, rather boldly I now think: "How can one remember them all?" He smiled: "Take any that pleases and chant that name. How about Hari, Govind, Gopal?" How many names has Krishna, besides these? Are they one hundred and eight or one thousand and eight? It little matters. They are, in the language of numbers, infinite. This wonderful old man, my teacher, was a Sikh, and his chanting — I can hear him now — with his harmonium or drum was rich and melodious, deep, as I was to discover later, like organ music. Perhaps that is why the harmonics of Bach, in, say, Schweitzer's playing, move me in a way I cannot possibly put into words.

My teacher's face would light up, as he played, like the candle that stood beside him, and his eyes, now open, now half-closed, shine like the sparks on Divali day. The incense which burned in the prayer-room would curl into the most fantastic rings before it rose, like a genie, and dissolved into space. Once when he had finished his *puja* and his *path*, I asked him a silly question: "Where were you?" "Why, here and everywhere," he said. I clapped my hands and said: "How wonderful! And with all people and all things?" "In a way." "Gosh," I said, "I'd like to be everywhere too, whirling like the wind which way I will! How free would I feel then! I am sure no one in the wide world can sing like you." My teacher put a restraining finger on his lips and said: "There are millions who sing like me all over the world. They often sing in

other tunes. All chants come from the same source, the same spring."

I am not sure I understood what he meant then, but years later the meaning of his words became clear to me. I was taught to read the words of the world's great prophets and saints and I knew they flowed from the same great spring. I was shown that while men, beasts, birds or plants had all a life of their own, in one way or another we were all connected. The Indian stories I had read were full of parrots or swans, dogs or horses, that spoke. What a world, as real as that of men, was that of the *Hitopadesha*! At once the meaning of "Tread softly, for all the earth is sacred," was to be understood.

I saw this sense of the sacred in all that breathed. I felt it in those tender things like lilies, doves and nightingales, and also in those terrifying creatures — toads, serpents and crocodiles. I knew I could become anything I wanted to. I had been all these, trees, birds and animals, once upon a time, and knew we always were a curious mixture of all that is grotesque or gorgeous anywhere. Many of earth's living wonders are, in a strange, unexplored way, part of me. Do I carry all the parcels of the past upon my back? I can be rid of them too. When I was doing something that took me away from the nightmarish world of my own imaginings into the world of other people, I was sharing the exultations and the grim despairs of others and being one with them. It is extraordinary how little we watch our movements and the things around us for themselves. We seem to be always somebody else. Odd how thoughts, ideas and images shimmer before our eyes without habitation or name. At one moment I could see, ranged before me, all the sinister figures of a ghoulish tale; and then, with a shifting of the eyes, they were transformed into this or that tree or the shade that was heaven to the pipe-player as he lay within sight of his grazing cattle.

I came to the conclusion that it all depended on how we looked at things. Shakespeare was right: there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. I had grown to look at this topsy-turvy world with fear, terror, joy, sometimes with humour. Nothing explained to me better than Ganesh, the elephant-headed deity, the senselessness of the world. And yet he makes a good deal of sense, really. Or, take that curious animal, a camel. Put him alongside the lines of cars in the Champs Elysées and he will look and feel quite absurd. Put him in the desert where he belongs and he will fit admirably into the landscape. Let him walk jauntily on the sands, and he will be a part of the picture. Absurdities seem insurmountable to some and inspiring to others.

In a way I felt, rather dimly at first, that we were out of our depth if we did not fit into a pattern. Was there really a pattern? And were there many patterns, according to climate and country? Can one ever put a limit to the million plays of the divine? Can one learn about one pattern and through it know the rest? I am all the joys and the sorrows of the world. In me are all the hates and fears of the world. When I hate and kill, or fear and doubt, somewhere, on people's faces, in the woods, in the fields, even in the torrent, a mark or a scratch appears. "Why is there a scratch upon your face?" a child asked her mother. "Why, because yesterday you struck with anger the cat that came to you." "Is that really so?" said the little girl, her eyes as large as almonds. "Each time you hurt or strike another somewhere a scratch appears. You see, the same God is in all of us. When we hurt others we also hurt ourselves." "And when I laugh and sing?" said the child. Why, then we catch a spark of

sunlight in our midst.

How can I fail to see this link that binds us all? I have come here to the West, I a man from another continent; how do I feel? In all these years in the West how have I discovered the other face of man? Man must pass through many travails before he enters the great Source. None of our efforts, even to Socrates learning to play the lyre when awaiting death, is ever wasted. One day Man will be Free and Liberated and be with all things, free from sorrow, anger, greed and death, good and evil. To many in the West, where I have spent two decades, found good friends and met great souls, to many people, this approach of mine was wrong. One of them, a true believer, after knowing how I felt, said I would go far if only I was not so scattered in my thinking, if I were to accept, as he did, the tenets of true religion. You talk, he said politely, like a pagan. If to respect and revere all beliefs, none of them perfect, is to be a pagan, then indeed I am a pagan. A pagan gone West.

The East and West were once two faces of the world. One has to go to myths for an explanation. According to the Greek myth, Heaven and Earth (Uranus and Gaea) once gave warning to Zeus that the offspring of Metis, genius of cosmic wisdom, would lead man away from the divine spirit. Zeus promptly swallowed Metis before her time came and the child sprang from his own forehead. This child, Pallas Athena, was worshipped as the goddess of science and art, the genius of harmony, justice and freedom.

The classical age of Greece sprang from the forehead of a divine being, and was not of human origin. Hence a new force, the age of the mind, was born. Before this period of mind, there was wisdom, one of insight, which permitted man to glimpse all things, medicine, mathematics or science, without an attempt to analyze or dissect them. How well the ancient priest-physicians knew what herbs healed, what waters brought life and how they were to be prepared! This earlier insight existed in the Western world once, and was provided by the back as against the front of the brain.

The classical age of Greece was that of the forehead, of man's ability to grasp what he once knew by instinct. The Greek statues of that period stressed the Olympian head and not the forehead of ordinary man. The gods knew that if Intellect, Metis's child, were to be born in average man it would separate him from profound wisdom. It might prove his undoing. Maturing intellect, the impulse which created the classical age, belonged to a divine, not a human domain. So when Christianity came it was hoped that intellect would be gradually entrusted to man's use. Had the fire of Christianity been permitted to draw fuel from pagan wisdom, its glow might have endured and given rise to a truly constructive science and civilization of world brotherhood. Since it did not, religion lost its foundation in earthly life, and science its moral aims. The mediæval Church knew the danger but not the cause and wanted to protect man from his premature individualism and so retarded the progress of science. Science cannot and should not be dethroned, but her reign in the West is not quite so fruitful since thought has not combined with love. Religion came to the West; it was a potentiality rather than a fulfilment.

The pre-Hellenic period of culture was the East, the back portion of the head, overwhelmingly intuitive.

Another myth, again from Greece, reflects the break. Europa, daughter of Agenor, had a dream at midnight when mortals have a clear vision of truth. A vision came asking her to choose between two continents: Asia and that

which lay on the other side. Both were eager to possess her. Next day, a festival, Zeus appeared in the shape of a bull and enticed her to climb on his back. She did so and was promptly carried off to Crete. When she bemoaned her fate, Aphrodite consoled her: Be comforted, Europa. You will be the mortal wife of Zeus, the unconquerable. Your name will be immortal from this time, for a whole continent will be named after you.

I am a pagan, and shall remain one, as I do not think the mind is all. I am not an intellectual, at least not in the sense in which Malraux, a great Western figure, defines it. To André Malraux an intellectual is not only a man to whom books are necessary; he is a man whose reasoning, however elementary it may be, affects and directs his life. Sartre calls his novel *The Age of Reason*. Yet the greatest creations of Western culture were not the products of reason alone. Here and there some people are trying to make the Occidental remember that he also has a back of the head, the realm of intuition, of memory, of all the strange invisibles which science does not want to accept because it cannot prove them. Can you prove love, beauty, friendship and joy? What instrument will you use?

BALDOON DHINGRA

Let no presuming impious railer tax
Creative Wisdom, as if aught was formed
In vain, or not for admirable ends.
Shall little haughty ignorance pronounce
His works unwise, of which the smallest part
Exceeds the narrow vision of her mind?

—THOMSON: *Seasons*

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

A new dimension to the economics of foreign aid has been given by President Kennedy's Peace Corps scheme, whereby young Americans proficient in different skills offer their services in host countries. While there were serious misgivings about the possible rôle of such a Peace Corps, and people both in the U.S.A. and elsewhere wondered whether such an army of voluntary workers would succeed in winning friends for the country or the gratitude of people among whom their work would lie, the Director of the Corps, Mr. Sargent Shriver, has dispelled these doubts in answering newsmen's questions at a Press Conference at Delhi recently. Explaining its functions in host countries, at the outset, Mr. Shriver (according to a report in *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi) said:—

> The Peace Corps scheme would be non-political and non-religious. The volunteers would be strictly warned against propagating evangelical activity. The volunteers would not, moreover, function as a distinct American group anywhere. They would be integrated with local people and function under the direction and discipline of the State Governments.

The Corps has no cut-and-dried schemes for social work nor is it anxious to impose its ideas on foreign communities. It merely offers its services to be utilized in the best way possible in consultation with the Governments concerned. This aspect was particularly emphasized by Mr. Shriver when he said that the Peace Corps

> did not go out to other countries with ready-made programmes. It only offered services. The programmes were to be determined by the governments concerned and also by consultation among the governments concerned, Peace Corps representatives and social workers with wide experience.

This is surely a realistic approach and, being an exciting experiment, the scheme should be found rewarding both by the visitors and the people among whom they will live and work.

What was only a talking point only a few weeks ago, is now shaping itself as a new instrument of international technical assistance, according to Vernon Chassell, in an article in *The Hindu* (Madras). He writes:—

> During the first two weeks, over 17,000 Americans offered their services. A rough classification shows that one-third of them are people with three to five years of professional experience or practical skill and who have some experience or qualification for overseas duty. Another third are people who have graduated in the last year or so, and the remaining third are those who are still in college. Needless to say, these young people have diverse interests and backgrounds; among them, for instance, are Sally Bowles, daughter of Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles, and Rafer Johnson, decathlon champion in the 1960 Olympics.

The Corps will not propagate religious or political views but will adopt local living standards, as

> this new generation of Americans is internationally-minded, is alive to the need for personal commitment to help lift up the developing nations, and is willing to forego remunerative job prospects at home to answer this challenge abroad.

It is pointed out that this scheme is formulated by President Kennedy to implement an election promise and to redeem the pledge given in his Inaugural Address last January, when he said:—

> To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the Communists are doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If the free society cannot help the many who are poor, it can never save the few who are rich.

Although this is the first time that such a project is being attempted on such a scale, the assignment of professional and skilled personnel overseas is not new, as already U.S. colleges and other organizations such as CARE (Co-operative for American Remittances Everywhere) and the International Voluntary Service are working in various parts of the world. Since many countries suffer from lack of personnel in specialized, trained fields such as education, engineering, industry, physical training, etc., the Peace Corps is not only a generous idea but a practical one deserving of all encouragement.

A plea for a different psychological approach and juster treatment for women in prison is made by the journalist Myrna Blumberg (*Guardian*, May 3rd and 5th, 1961). A five-and-a-half-weeks' imprisonment last year, without charge or trial, in a South African gaol at Capetown, set her questioning the emotional and psychological reactions of women to captivity. In these two moving articles, she shows — what should be obvious, but is not treated as such — that women are different and more sensitive than men. There "is an average of 20 times more men than women in British prisons each year" and the latter are mainly cases of simple minor larceny. Her survey draws evidence from ordinary prisoners, anti-nuclear demonstrators, prison visitors and other experts, as well as from considerable reading.

What shocked the educated women imprisoned for political reasons was the degrading systematic way in which prisoners are "reduced to a state of penned-in infantility." There are exceptions and attempts to humanize conditions, but these amount to tragically little compared to the need. And women, who are according to a London psychologist "potentially more claustrophobic than men," suffer more and develop nervous disorders, compulsions, anxiety states, when their emotional needs "for family, homeliness, individual attention, gentleness" are frustrated. There is compulsive talking without cessation, even to themselves, and prowling up and down like Zoo animals (where too, apparently, the female animals accustom themselves less easily to captivity).

Women prisoners are more individualistic than men; there is less "ganging together" though they will help each other. One report quoted cited a sample group of 26 women, some of whom had over 100 convictions, all of a petty nature, and almost all were homeless. Since each prisoner's board and lodging costs £7 a week, providing a suitable homely hostel for them would seem a cheaper and more humane way of treatment. A United Nations report on a conference on crime held in 1960 suggests alternatives for short-term imprisonment, such as cottage-type institutions, more use of fines, etc., which are worth experimenting with. But, whatever method is tried, its success will depend on the personal touch and the heart quality and discrimination brought to the task by those in charge.

The vast, terrifying road-traffic problems of the more urbanized and affluent countries grow almost hourly, but suggested material and technical remedies ruin other things of value or increase the disease. In a B.B.C. talk, "Men in Motor-Cars," J. M. Richard, Joint Editor of the *Architectural Review*, diagnoses the problem as mainly due to self-centredness, plus false values.

He points out the large price we pay for the worship of the car, apart from money poured out on road-making, towns and cities torn apart by traffic demands, useless sacrifices of time and energy and resulting frustrations; and he urges that we cease to consider cars simply as private assets. The motor-car "has been given an inflated social and psychological value that has no connexion with its usefulness as a transport machine." It is "a symbol of affluence" fostered by pressure from manufacturers, while gigantic dumps of discarded cars provide a further problem.

It is significant that driving a car is at present almost the only outlet for a feeling of personal skill and power as well as self-assertion. But when the fast (and dangerous) driver is glamourized in a way no other criminal is, he becomes a false model for the young. Further, when each individual uses time, energy and an excess share of space by driving his car *solus* (especially in the "business rush") it is as primitive, inefficient and wasteful as it would be to make every person in a factory carry out each operation individually on his own complete set of machines. Planning for road transport and planning for housing are also similar. Recognition of the wisdom of town and country planning is growing, but society has not yet seen "the imbecility of allowing free rein to the individual motor-car." Its legitimate use "as a transport-machine" has been usurped by its employment as means of personal self-assertion.

Purely restrictive legislation will not help. Mr. Richards suggests three remedies:

(1) Provide people with other outlets for their legitimate need of self-expression, repressed by the deadening nature of many people's work.

(2) Re-educate them by "the improvement and reglamourization of public transport" to realize that it can be made a most comfortable and efficient method of travel. Instead of mental associations of inconvenience, squalor, obsolete equipment, it would evoke pride of service and renaissance of public enthusiasm for as yet untried possibilities in experimentation (*e.g.*, monorail). The capacity to organize — orchestras, athletics, transport, etc. — indicates a step towards civilization.

(3) Treat public transport as a public service, whose smooth running is as vital to the community as a public sanitation system.

Such a change of attitude would remove all the problems now being attempted piecemeal — the vivisection of cities by road-widening, the temptation vast car-parks offer to larger amounts of traffic. Further, it would do away with the anti-social character of so much car-driving, when each person moving about on business by car is "spending more and more of his life shut up by himself in a metal box." If he can free himself from the false notions of "glamour and satisfaction" connected with it, he will find it a gain.

We might add that man is also imprisoned in his own personal mental and bodily "metal box" which he has glamourized into "a false notion of self." How to be free from this desire-driven "machine" is a still more fundamental problem.

Many are the speeches made by national leaders and many the legislative measures undertaken to eradicate the evil of casteism from Indian society; but the grievous fact is that the shackles of caste are still not broken. Analyzing this problem, which has been the bane of Indian society in recent years, Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao, in a special article in *The Indian Express* (Delhi), outlines certain positive measures to abolish this evil. He says:—

> Caste cannot be destroyed by speeches, nor can it be abolished by legislation. Speeches help, but only if they are accompanied by action on the part of those who make the speeches. The masses are always influenced by the behaviour of the classes; and if they find the latter functioning on the basis of caste loyalties, then it is not possible to expect the latter to cease thinking in caste terms.

Urging that society should, either through Governmental agencies or voluntary agencies with State support, make available the economic benefits and aids that a caste does for its weaker members, the writer adds:—

> Caste will not give way either to abuse or to appeal; it is only an objective and fact-based exposure of its undesirable consequences that can make a dent on this hoary feature of Indian society. This must be accompanied by deliberate steps to remove the economic and educational handicap of the masses of those sub-castes that are now in a state of backwardness; and there must be objective and documented reporting on what is being achieved.

He also points out that although this evil system draws its life from the principle of heredity, its vigour and exploitable potential are proportional to the extent to which it remains identified with economic, political and social inequalities. He, therefore, suggests that the only way in which we can really undermine caste is to go in for the actual building up of a society with equality of opportunity and special attention for the handicapped; and this in turn cannot be done unless those of us who wield either power or influence in any field are prepared to give up exploiting caste for purposes of self-advancement and all combine, irrespective of the caste or sub-caste to which we may belong, to produce economic and political conditions that will be primarily dominated by considerations of mass welfare and the recognition and maintenance of human dignity.

Dr. Rao, however, sees promise in certain recent trends such as the abolition of untouchability and the opening of temples to Harijans, etc., and points out that the present need is to intensify these measures through ceaseless education and the economic emancipation of the masses. He says:—

> I do believe that caste as an evil influence is on the way out; its present upsurge of strength is like the last flicker of a candle before its light goes out; only in this case, the light will not go out automatically. It needs the dedicated effort and example of all men of influence or power or status to give the needed push that will open the door to a casteless society in India.

The problem of casteism is also analyzed by "A Student of Politics" in *The Statesman* (New Delhi). He surveys the current forces at work changing the political landscape and the significant directions in which changes in the social and economic structure have taken place in the past decade. He points out the differences between the caste association and other natural associations found in this country, *viz.*, tribal, linguistic and religious, particularly in their relation to the political community, the nation-State. While the latter kinds of

association represent potential political communities, claiming separate political identity, or an autonomous unit in the federation, castes, according to the writer, have no such aspiration.

The various ways and means by which caste groups have been jostling for position in the different States of India are discussed in the article and the conclusion drawn that castes have created difficulties and provoked splits in the political organizations rather than imparted strength to them.

> The opportunist meanderings of the politicians have encouraged opportunist behaviour among the voters. Over a third of the voters, according to public opinion polls, are unattached. The growing tendency among such voters is to get on the band-wagon of the winning candidate.

In conclusion, he urges that an effective response to the gathering challenge to the ideals of Indian nationalism lies in going on the offensive against the forces represented by casteism:—

> It needs the rallying together of like-minded forces dedicated to social democratic ideals. It asks for lifting the sights above traditional party interests. It envisages appeal to youth, and restoring to politics its old *elan* and significance. It demands a break with many mistakes of the past; communicating to the people the realization that democracy is an adventure in hope, growth and change.

It is gratifying to note, from a report in *The Hindu* (Madras), that the Executive Council of the Banaras Hindu University has decided to conduct the proceedings of its Convocation in Sanskrit from the next year and that its diplomas will be written in Sanskrit as well as in English. Sanskrit may not be a spoken language but, being "the language of the gods," as the ancients described it, interest in it must be fostered; for it is through Sanskrit that India has maintained the continuity of her culture throughout the centuries.

According to a report in *The Indian Express* (Delhi), referring to the citation read out in Sanskrit by Dr. R. N. Dandekar at a special Convocation at the University of Poona, Pandit Nehru observed:—

> I wish I knew sufficient Sanskrit. Now there is not much time left for me to learn it anew. . . . The seats of learning like the Universities could derive inspiration from Sanskrit literature and the treasure of knowledge which it contains.

It is a welcome sign of the times that, since independence, several leaders have proposed the adoption of Sanskrit as the country's national language and many enthusiasts have been demanding its use as the medium of instruction. While these suggestions may not be practicable, it is not only desirable but necessary that the treasures of Sanskrit literature should be translated and made available to all the people in the world.

Critics may argue that the average student, already burdened with the task of learning several languages, should not be called upon to master the intricacies of Sanskrit grammar. While conceding this, we may urge that the times at least need that Sanskrit works should be translated into modern Indian languages and made accessible to people all over the country. At the same time, those who aspire to scholarship in Sanskrit should be helped and institutions promoting the study of Sanskrit should be encouraged to produce more and more interpretative and critical books.

SOME INTERESTING BOOKS ON INDIA

	Rs. nP.
Mukherjea : Parliamentary Procedure in India ...	25.00
Salim Ali : Indian Hill Birds	25.00
Salim Ali : Book of Indian Birds	20.00
Toru Dutt : Ancient Ballads & Legends of Hindustan ...	2.50
Bela Bose : Dramas of Shri Harsha	5.25
Wynter Blyth : Butterflies of the Indian Region ...	28.00
Bor & Raizada : Some Beautiful Indian Climbers & Shrubs ...	22.00
Nehru : Discovery of India	4.12
Nehru : A Bunch of Old Letters	12.50
Radhakrishnan : Occasional Speeches & Writings ...	3.75
Wright : History of Nepal	15.00
Gokhale : Making of Indian Nation	15.50
M. C. Dutt : Poems of Kalidasa	5.50
Organization of the Government of India	20.00
Mookerjee : Modern Art of India	34.00
Mukherjee : Dynamics of a Rural Society ...	10.70
Majumdar : Races & Cultures of India	22.50
Vinoba Bhave : Talks on the Gita	2.00
Gongoly : Indian Art & Heritage	16.50
Sharma : Sudras in Ancient India	15.00
Raghavan : The Indian Heritage	13.00
Gordan : Pre-Historic Background of Indian Culture ...	20.00
Sukthankar : On the Meaning of the Mahabharata ...	10.00
Venkatrayappa : Bangalore—a Sociological Study ...	16.50
Indian Miniatures—12 Post Cards	2.00

The above books or any other books on India can be had from :

INTERNATIONAL BOOK HOUSE PRIVATE LTD.

Head Office :
9, Ash Lane
Fort, BOMBAY-1

Branch Office :
4/F, Mahatma Gandhi Rd.
BANGALORE-1

for

HIGH CLASS FURNITURE of
Latest Continental Designs
For: HOME, OFFICES, SCHOOLS,
THEATRES, RESTAURANTS, PUBLIC
LIBRARIES & GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
IN
Rosewood - Whitecedar - Teakwood

MODERN
WOODCRAFTS

Head Office & Factory :
Post Box No. 6, Tellicherry
KERALA
GRAMS: "REVEL" PHONES: 82 & 83

EQUIPPED WITH LATEST MACHINERY,
BEST TECHNICIANS AND SKILLED WORKERS

SHOWROOMS & OFFICES:

MADRAS:	BANGALORE:	COCHIN:	CALICUT:
"Jaya Mansions" 13, Poonamallee High Road, Madras-3 Grams: "Woodcrafts" Phone: 5210	264, Cavalry Road Bangalore-1 Grams: "Woodcrafts" Phone: 6941	6/75, Calvetty Cochin-1 Grams: "Revel" Phones: 4007, 4030 and 4686	North Beach Road (Near Customs House) Calicut-1 Grams: "Revel" Phone: 2251

SPECIALISTS FOR FLUSH DOORS &
LATEST MODEL BANK COUNTERS

Printed and published by M. Narayan at W. Q. Judge Press [International Book House (Private), Ltd.], 1, Shri B. P. Wadia Road, Bangalore 4, for the International Book House (Private), Ltd., 9, Ash Lane, Mahatma Gandhi Road. Bombay 1.
Edited by Sophia Wadia, "Theosophy Hall," 40. New Marine Lines. Bombay 1, India